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ABSTRACT
Brownfields --abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where
expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination --
have garnered much attention from planners, politicians, and the media in recent years. Many
brownfields are located in distressed neighborhoods, where they can lead to a downward spiral
of disinvestment and declining quality of life for local residents. Policy makers and city officials
hope that remediating and redeveloping brownfields will provide such public benefits including
reduced health risks, jobs for local residents, revitalized neighborhoods, enhanced municipal tax
bases.
However, little research has been undertaken to document the actual benefits of brownfields
revitalization. Those studies that have estimated the benefits of brownfields redevelopment have
tended to examine projects through a narrow lens of certain economic development benchmarks,
or have aggregated benefits across the nation, thus complicating project-by-project comparisons.
In addition, many state policies designed to encourage brownfields redevelopment do not require
a detailed evaluation of the public benefits of proposed projects. Although public funding to
provide incentives for brownfields redevelopment is quite limited compared to need for project
subsidies, few state brownfields programs base public funding allocations on the degree to which
potential projects would provide public benefits.
This research examines five brownfields redevelopment case studies, each in a different state and
with a different type of redevelopment. The results from the case studies suggest that the
benefits of brownfields redevelopment are indeed broader than those measured by -the traditional
benchmarks. Expanding the scope of project evaluation techniques to include community-based
social, environmental, and economic benefits would provide a different picture of project success
than evaluations based only on metropolitan or regional level economic benefits. This thesis
identifies areas where new benchmarks could be developed, and suggests how this information
could inform the prioritization of projects that require public subsidies.
Thesis Supervisor: William Shutkin
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The potential for brownfields redevelopment to revitalize distressed urban areas has
garnered much attention from planners, politicians, and the media in recent years. Brownfields
are commonly defined as abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination (Smart Growth Network 1996, Wright 1997, Simmons 1998, Brownfields
National Partnership 1999, Greenberg et. al. 1999, Rafson and Rafson 1999). No two
brownfield properties are alike: they vary in their location, history, type and degree of
contamination, market value, size, and potential for reuse. Yet it is commonly understood that
brownfields impose costs on their owners and especially on the communities in which they are
located. Brownfields are thought to spur disinvestment in already distressed neighborhoods,
leading to a downward spiral of declining quality of life, abandonment, and dwindling tax base.
The U.S. Department of Urban Housing and Urban Development (HUD) claims that "The
existence of derelict former industrial areas worsens many of the other problems cities must
confront, such as out-migration of the middle class, poverty, crime and deterioration of the
education system (HUD 1994)." The Brownfields National Partnership, a coalition of twenty-
seven federal agencies and national non-profit associations and advocacy groups, asserts that
brownfields are at the center of a vexing tangle of problems that include environmental
degradation, unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure and housing, and crime. The
Partnership's 1999 report states that many brownfields were once "thriving factories or industrial
centers - sources of economic vitality, jobs, and community pride. Now however, these
neighborhood sites are sources of potential health hazards and indicators of urban blight."
Brownfields are pervasive across American communities. The reluctance of cities and
states to compile lists of brownfield sites for fear of further discouraging investment, as well as
variations in brownfields definitions, complicate efforts to calculate the total number of
brownfields in the United States. However, c urrent estimates range from 450,000 to 600,000
brownfields sites across America (Simons 1998b, CUED 1999). A recent survey of 201 cities by
the U.S. Conference of Mayors calculated that there are more than 81,000 acres of brownfields in
this country (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2000). A 1994 report by the Conference of Mayors
identified brownfields "as the number one environmental issue in the nation (Brownfields
National Partnership 1999)," and in 1998 the Conference made the brownfields issue their first
priority for legislative action in that year (Greenberg et. al. 1999).
If the brownfields problem seems vast, so too are the claims about the potential benefits
resulting from brownfields redevelopment. Many people and organizations have invested great
hope in the potential for cleaning and reusing contaminated properties. Expected benefits
include reduced environmental health risks, jobs for local residents, revitalized neighborhoods,
enhanced municipal tax base, and profits for real estate developers. Advocates for brownfields
redevelopment believe that site reuse will create and retain jobs in central cities, "where some
popular notions of justice suggest that the wealth-generating activities of the past should not be a
costly legacy to the nation's urban poor (Allardice 1995)." Christian Bollwage, Mayor of
Elizabeth, New Jersey, exemplifies this perspective when she states that brownfields sites
represent "new opportunities to create new industries, additional jobs, better housing, and more
tax revenues (U.S. Conference of Mayors 1998)." Massachusetts Governor Paul Cellucci
provides another example of these expectations. In 1998 Cellucci introduced the state's
brownfields law with the assertion that it would "add fuel to the already red-hot economy by
paving the way for the development of thousands of sites that have been abandoned, encouraging
businesses to build, and creating new jobs for neighborhood residents (Bulkley, Richardson and
Gelinas 1998)."
Not only do supporters expect brownfield redevelopment to revitalize the urban
neighborhoods where the sites are located, but they also assert that redeveloping brownfields can
reduce development pressure on rural and undeveloped sites, known as greenfields. "Many
argue that urban-oriented brownfield redevelopment policies are needed to offset the current
biases toward greenfield development that tend to produce urban sprawl (Allardice 1995)." Lee
Clancey, Mayor of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, made the point clearly, asserting that "by redeveloping
brownfields sites, we will be preserving valuable farmland and forests for future generations
(U.S. Conference of Mayors 1998)." Governor Cellucci made similar claims for the
Massachusetts brownfields law, saying that it would "preserve pristine greenspace by keeping
economic development confined to commercial areas (National Governors Association 1998)."
Representatives from across the political spectrum have embraced the brownfields issue.
For example, Presidential candidate George W. Bush, in a recent speech outlining his
environmental policies, stated that "Brownfield cleanups and redevelopments represent the kind
of cooperative spirit and results-oriented approach that, under my presidency, will guide our
nation's environmental agenda. ... The old system of mandate, regulate, and litigate only sends
potential developers off in search of greener pastures - literally (Bush 2000)." Meanwhile, Vice
President Al Gore has championed the brownfields issue for several years, claiming that
"Revitalizing brownfields will help the citizens of America's cities rebuild their own
communities on a new foundation of hope (National Brownfields Partnership 1999)."
The media has joined politicians in praising the benefits of brownfields redevelopment.
A recent study by Greenburg et. al. (1999) that analyzed media coverage of brownfields in 23
U.S. metropolitan regions found that "as a body of evidence the articles overwhelmingly cast
brownfields in a positive light." A majority (53%) of the stories was primarily about economic
redevelopment, and 20% of the articles discussed removal of the hazard as an important benefit
to the community. The overwhelming tone of the media coverage on brownfields has been very
positive, leading the authors of the study to conclude that the brownfields issue is in a
"honeymoon period."
This recognition of the potential for brownfields sites has resulted in significant federal,
state and local initiatives to encourage redevelopment. In the last three years, the federal
government alone has invested an estimated $385 million in order to encourage brownfields
redevelopment (National Brownfields Partnership 1999). Meanwhile, all but four states have
established some type of brownfields incentive program, whether in the form of a voluntary
cleanup program, brownfields financing, tax incentives for cleanup, or some combination
(Bartsch and Anderson 1998). More than half of the 231 cities responding to the U.S.
Conference of Mayors' 1999 brownfields survey indicated that local or state jurisdictions offered
tax incentives, liability protection, low-interest loans, or grants to spur brownfields
redevelopment.
What has all this investment achieved, and how have policy makers evaluated progress
towards brownfield policy goals? These questions are at the core of this thesis. I examine five
brownfields case studies in order to evaluate the fit between the public benefits provided by the
projects, the project goals, and evaluative techniques that have been used to date to measure the
success of brownfields policies. I also compare different theories and practices of prioritizing
brownfields projects in order to ascertain whether policies are in fact being implemented in ways
that fulfill the frequent claims about the benefits of brownfields redevelopment. My purpose is
to look for clues in the actual results of brownfields projects that could suggest adjustments to
brownfields policy evaluation. Ultimately, I seek to provide data that could inform efforts to
improve brownfields policies so that they may achieve the broadest possible public benefits
given limited resources available to undertake redevelopment.
I have organized this thesis into six chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter
summarizes background for the thesis, including the history of the brownfields issue, efforts to
prioritize brownfields for redevelopment, and techniques that have been used to evaluate the
outcomes of brownfields policies. The third chapter outlines my methodology for the case
studies. The fourth chapter presents the five case studies. The fifth chapter analyzes the case
studies to ascertain common goals and community benefits provided by the projects and compare
these outcomes to those measured by the traditional benchmarks of brownfields success. The
final chapter concludes by reflecting on what these results could suggest for the reprioritization
of brownfields redevelopment and opportunities for brownfields policy implementation.
CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY
Brownfields in the United States are the legacy of a century and a half of intense
industrial development. In the past, many manufacturers and industrial service providers were
largely unaware of or unconcerned about the environmental impacts of their operations. Wastes
were often stored or dumped on site, where they could contaminate the soil, groundwater, and/or
surface water. In the 1970s, public concern about the environmental and human health impacts
of such dumping practices grew. In response to public pressure, Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in
1980. Congress intended CERCLA to force cleanup of existing environmental contamination by
requiring those responsible for pollution to pay for its cleanup and damages. Since many of the
polluting parties had already.gone bankrupt and no longer existed as corporate entities, CERCLA
established a $1.6 billion, five-year revolving loan fund (Superfund) to finance environmental
cleanups (Meyer, Williams and Yount 1995). In order to promote settlements with EPA, shift
the costs of cleanup onto private parties, and create a disincentive for future pollution, CERCLA
imposed a standard of strict, joint, and several liability. Strict liability means that any current or
past owner or operator of a contaminated property, or any party that contributed to the
contamination of the site, may be held liable without regard to fault for the contamination. Joint
and several liability means that the government may sue any single party for the full cost of the
remediation, regardless of how much of the contamination that particular party caused.
The direct impact of Superfund on contaminated properties has been immense: as of May
11, 2000, the US EPA listed 1,227 uncontrolled hazardous waste sites that required further
cleanup on its National Priority List (NPL) (U.S. EPA 2000). However, CERCLA has affected
far more properties indirectly. Because of fears of liability, the law has had a chilling effect on
any real estate transactions involving a possible environmental contamination, however small the
risk or slight the contamination. Brownfields sites are those that are not on the NPL, but still
have some degree or perception of contamination. Real estate developers, prospective site
owners, and lenders all have been wary of assuming the risks associated with brownfields,
especially when the potential costs of cleanup are unknown and there is no certainty about which
cleanup standards are adequate. Brownfields sites often face multiple challenges in addition to
environmental contamination (HUD 1998). Sites may have low market value due to factors such
as inadequate access or infrastructure for modern industrial facilities, small parcel sizes that
require assembly, zoning or other regulatory constraints, or security concerns. All of these
factors can further deter redevelopment.
In the past five years there has been a widespread effort on the part of federal, state, and
local governments to encourage brownfields redevelopment. These brownfields initiatives can
provide legal clarification to reduce liability concerns, set risk-based cleanup standards in order
to reduce regulatory uncertainties, subsidize project financing and/or environmental insurance, or
provide technical assistance and regulatory guidance to developers. The federal government has
been active in encouraging brownfields redevelopment by removing some of the less
contaminated sites from the NPL, providing grants and tax incentives to spur cleanup, and
issuing closure letters after cleanup is complete to assure developers and owners that the
government will not sue them at some future time for additional cleanup costs. As of 1998,
thirty-eight states had established formal voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) (Rafson and
Rafson 1999). VCPs vary by state but are generally designed to provide some legal certainty and
closure on environmental liability by executing agreements with developers who voluntarily
clean up a brownfield. In the past few years many states have created new incentives for
redevelopment or revised their existing brownfields legislation. Local governments have also
encouraged brownfields redevelopment by providing tax abatement programs, issuing general
obligation bonds, and using their Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds as
collateral to finance short-term loans for brownfields projects. Local governments sometimes
catalog lists of brownfields development opportunities in order to attract developers, or they may
assemble and clean sites themselves before turning them over for development.
The government's efforts to encourage brownfields redevelopment can be set in the
broader context of changing theories of environmental policy. In recent years, environmental
agencies have moved away from a "command and control" approach to more cooperative tactics
to reduce pollution. Policy changes to enable brownfields redevelopment have embodied the
notion that environmental agencies should encourage voluntary compliance rather than relying
solely on enforcement and litigation. The regulatory framework encouraging brownfields
redevelopment emerges from a common understanding that environmental legislation can go too
far. The laws that turned each brownfield into a liability tar-baby have been widely renounced as
being too restrictive and requiring too much cleanup. The standard of strict, joint, and several
liability that was initially imposed on anyone in the chain of title for a contaminated property has
been reined in. The EPA has tailored cleanup standards to the specific risks posed by
environmental contaminants on the site, rather than requiring a one-size-fits-all approach to
cleanup. Many hope that brownfield policies can provide environmentally safe, pro-
development incentives that balance environmental, economic, and social objectives.
B. PRIORITIZING BROWNFIELDS
One of the difficult policy questions that complicate government efforts to spur
brownfields redevelopment is the question of how to target redevelopment incentives. Research
in the Great Lakes area has suggested that, at least for older industrial regions of the country,
there are far more brownfields sites than there are sources of public or private funds to carry out
redevelopment. For example, in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Milwaukee, researchers
estimate that there will be a 30-50 year supply of brownfields relative to demand (Simons
1998a). Simons concludes that the large supply-demand ratio for brownfields is probably widely
applicable, noting that "Most large markets probably contain, many, decades worth of brownfields
compared with demand for non-residential real estate."
It is also true that the conditions of brownfields vary widely. Some brownfields are
highly marketable, while others, especially those in distressed neighborhoods, are unlikely to
induce private sector demand, even with substantial public incentives. One common way to
characterize this situation is to divide brownfields sites into three tiers as follows (Smart Growth
Network 1998, Simmens 1996):
" Tier I: Sites with high development potential. Due to favorable locations (e.g. waterfront,
central business district, or suburban sites), transportation access, adequate infrastructure,
appropriate configuration and acreage, minimal contamination, and high market demand,
these sites are likely to attract traditional sources of private capital through market forces.
Private sector developers are expected to take the lead on redevelopment, and public
involvement is limited to non-monetary assistance such as clarifying regulations, reducing
liability for innocent owners, or rezoning or permitting.
- Tier 2: Sites with medium development potential. These sites require public incentives
and/or financial assistance to attract private-sector redevelopment interest, and would not be
redeveloped without public sector involvement. If the public sector does commit to an up-
front investment of resources, these sites can be successfully redeveloped and turned over to
the private market. Redevelopment often proceeds through a public-private partnership with
some public sector financing. Sites may be marketable for specialized developers with
experience in brownfields redevelopment or access to alternative funding sources.
- Tier 3: Sites with poor development potential. Due to small size or poor configuration,
extensive contamination, poor location, and/or low market demand these sites do not attract
private-sector interest even with a full range of public incentives. They may remain
abandoned indefinitely unless the public sector takes the lead on remediation and
redevelopment.
One recent study attempted to distinguish the various impacts of these different tiers of
brownfields on nearby properties (Greenberg et. al. 1999). The authors coined the term TOADS,
or temporarily obsolete abandoned derelict sites, to identify a form of virulent brownfields that
have a substantial negative effect on the neighborhoods surrounding the site. In the state of New
Jersey, where the study was conducted, the authors found that only ten percent of brownfields
sites caused certain neighborhood impacts beyond the perimeter of the site. The measured
impacts included reduced property values, affected property transactions, and deterred land use
in the surrounding neighborhood. Approximately one third of these sites, or three percent of the
total brownfields studied, affected an area more than one-quarter of a mile away from the site
and forced multiple land use changes. The authors also note that "Brownfields associated with
the most serious neighborhood impacts are disproportionately located in neighborhoods where
the neighborhood has crime, other unsafe conditions, is suffering from an erosion of its industrial
employment base, and lacks services." This study's estimate of the percentage of brownfields
having these off-site impacts may be conservative due to position of respondents. The study
relied on a survey of appraisers, who are likely to err on the side of underreporting impacts on
property value. In addition, the study's conclusions may not apply in states other than New
Jersey, and does not address other types of impacts not related to property use and value.
However, this research does strongly suggest that only a fraction of all contaminated sites
produce some of the negative neighborhood impacts typically associated with brownfield sites.
Unfortunately, existing brownfields incentives do not typically address those sites that
have the most substantial off-site impacts. The authors note that "Most municipal brownfields
programs appear to be focusing on tier one sites in order to gain as much benefit as possible in
the shortest period of time." The authors conclude by saying that "Neighborhoods affected by
high impact TOADS and multiple other problems cannot be addressed within the relatively
narrow framework of a typical brownfields project. A combination of government, community,
for profit and non profit groups is needed to create and implement a vision for the neighborhood
as a whole, including the brownfield as one element (Greenberg et. al. 1999)."
Taken together, these studies suggest the following conclusions: 1) the supply of
brownfields exceeds the market demand for brownfields, 2) those sites that are not highly
marketable will require some, perhaps substantial, public investment, 3) only a fraction of
brownfields sites actually impose the type of negative neighborhood impacts as are typically
associated with brownfields, and 4) those brownfields that do have significant negative impacts
on surrounding properties are disproportionately located in distressed neighborhoods where
private and public investment is less likely to occur. Although the evidence has not yet been
fully developed, it seems reasonable to conclude that those brownfields that are most likely to
impose costs on the general public (i.e. those in surrounding neighborhoods with no connection
to the property) may be least likely to be redeveloped.
Given that 1) only a fraction of the brownfield sites in existence are likely to be
redeveloped due to oversupply and 2) those sites that are most likely impose costs on
surrounding neighborhoods may be least likely to be redeveloped, it is important to consider how
current brownfields policies are allocating incentives for redevelopment. There are several
theories about how public incentives for brownfields redevelopment should be targeted, and
actual federal and state policies take a variety of different approaches. I review these theories
and practices below in order to examine how brownfields sites are currently prioritized.
One theory about how to prioritize sites for redevelopment is to catalyze development on
the most marketable (Tier I) sites first, recognizing that public funds are limited and many sites
simply may never be redeveloped. This approach is commonly advocated as the only reasonable
solution from an economic perspective. As the Allardice (1995) notes, "Identifying those sites
that may require the least amount of cleanup and re-engineering while delivering the greatest
economic development impact is a sound strategy and can ensure that resources are not
squandered cleaning up a location that would be of little redevelopment value even when
returned to sound environmental condition." HUD (1998) quotes a city brownfields coordinator
in Oregon who puts the situation in stark terms. "From a strategic perspective, take the least
contaminated, high amenity location.. .put that to some good economic use, and then sort of
work toward the darker hole, the black hole. Only because then you've got economics working
for you, you can create a synergy.. .that works. If it's not a high demand area, or can't be created
into a high demand area, it doesn't matter what you do."
If we accept the most-marketable-first strategy, the question then arises of what to do
with non-viable sites that will not be redeveloped. Simons (1998a) suggests that cities be
responsible for identifying and "banking" such land, indefinitely or until such time as demand
catches up with the supply of brownfields. He asserts that "More attention needs to be paid to
reducing the negative effects- of blighted brownfields on the local community. Because market
demand is not sufficient to support most brownfields, a more modest goal is to turn them into
neutral uses, such as buffers between incompatible land uses, active and passive recreation, or
community gardens." Of course, in order for contaminated land to be used as community
gardens or parks, it must be remediated to relatively high standards because of the relatively
large opportunities for human exposure to environmental contaminants. These standards will
require relatively expensive approaches to site redemption. Yet, where sites are not redeveloped
into economically productive reuses, the land will not generate revenues to offset the costs of
cleanup and maintenance. Therefore, the land banking strategy would entail significant and
ongoing public costs.
In fact, Charles Bartsch, a brownfields expert from the Northeast-Midwest Institute in
Washington, D.C., notes that many cities that would like to take the land-banking approach are
having difficulty in justifying the public costs of remediation and site maintenance (personal
communication, April 2000). These city officials are looking for ways to quantify and monetize
the spin-off benefits associated with re-use of sites as parkland and open space.
A second theory for how to prioritize sites for redevelopment combines several factors,
including market demand, potential community benefits of site redevelopment, and potential
impacts of redevelopment. This Smart Growth Network described this theory in its 1996 report
An Integrated Approach for Brownfield Redevelopment: A Priority Setting Tool. The authors
suggest that as a first step, public proponents of brownfields redevelopment such as city
governments target geographic areas that contain: 1) mixed land uses and highly exposed
minority and low income populations, 2) industrial areas with large tracts of land, and/or 3)
waterfront or central business districts that would be highly marketable. Within each targeted
geographical area, the agency would identify brownfields sites and characterize each site with
regard to its marketability. For those sites with high marketability (Tier I), redevelopment would
be driven by private investment, and the public role would be limited to simplifying or
coordinating the permitting and regulatory procedures required for redevelopment. No further
prioritization would be necessary for highly marketable sites, given that redevelopment would
occur according to market demands.
For sites with moderate or low marketability (Tiers II and III), public involvement would
be more extensive, and further prioritization would be necessary. In this case, the agency would
screen sites for high potential benefits to the community based on characteristics of the
neighborhood, the site, and the redevelopment plan. Finally, sites would be evaluated with
regard to potential impacts of the project, such as environmental, social, and economic benefits,
as well as any negative impacts of the project on the community. In this theory of site
prioritization, public investment in brownfields redevelopment would be targeted to sites with
moderate or low marketability and with significant potential for positive impacts on the
surrounding community. This theory stands in stark contrast to the most-marketable-first theory
of site prioritization, given that public funds would be directed to less marketable sites rather that
the most marketable sites.
While these two theories of site prioritization have been articulated in the literature, in
practice states implementing brownfields policies have taken a diversity of approaches to the
issue. Many states do not target their brownfields incentives at all, but rather accept eligible
applications on a first-come, first-serve basis. As Bartsch notes, the attitude of most states is
"bring 'em on down (personal communication, April 2000)." In this scenario, if a proposed
project meets certain threshold conditions, the state makes no attempt to target incentives but
rather tries to process as many applications as possible in the order they are received. In effect,
this may become a most-marketable-first strategy, because private project proponents will only
apply for incentives where there is sufficient market demand. The non-targeted approach seems
to be especially common for states whose programs are only offering liability relief (e.g.
covenant not to sue programs or no further action letters), rather than financial incentives for
brownfields development. States may be more likely to see liability relief as a relatively
unlimited resource (the only limitation being the time of public employees to negotiate and
prepare covenants not to sue), whereas financial incentives are more clearly limited pools of
resources that must be allocated among many potential projects.
When states do target incentives, policies frequently attempt to balance the goal of
cleaning up sites in less advantaged communities with the need to leverage private
redevelopment dollars in order to achieve site cleanup, thus requiring site marketability. Based
on a state-by-state review of brownfields policies (Bartsch and Anderson 1999), I have selected
several states that show the diversity of approaches to site prioritization Prioritization methods
vary widely between states and across programs within states. Some states, such as Indiana and
Ohio, prioritize sites primarily based on economic distress of the neighborhood where the site is
located. Other states, such as New York, Oregon and Massachusetts, use a combination of an
assessment of the public benefit of the redevelopment and the distress of the neighborhood.
Finally, states such as New Jersey and Texas have adopted the most-marketable-first strategy.
States may be adopting different approaches towards prioritization because of variations
in their policy goals or the condition of brownfields within their jurisdiction. Alternatively,
states may be taking diverse approaches because this area of policy is new, and each state is
working in relative isolation to develop its own redevelopment strategy. If the latter explanation
is correct (and in my judgement it is at least partially true), then it may be possible to learn from
the diversity of policy experiments at the state level. Examining individual state policies may
allow policy makers to draw some conclusions about the most effective approaches towards site
prioritization given the general goals of brownfields redevelopment and the limitations of public
funding. I describe individual state's approaches to prioritizing sites for redevelopment below.
' I use the term "prioritization" broadly, to include both threshold criteria that the project must meet and more literal
prioritization, where projects are ordered according to the degree to which they meet certain objectives. I include
thresholds as a part of my prioritization discussion because by ruling out certain sites, threshold policies narrow the
pool of eligible projects and thus target the incentives for redevelopment. I do not include as a part of this
discussion threshold criteria relating to the eligibility or innocence of the site owner or prospective developer, since
these characteristics do not relate directly to the conditions of the site itself.
1. Prioritization Based on Economic Distress
Ohio
Ohio's Voluntary Action Program (VAP) encourages voluntary brownfields remediation
by providing covenants not to sue for owners that meet cleanup requirements. There are six state
programs within the VAP that offer financial support for brownfields redevelopment. (Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency 1999) Three of these financial incentives prioritize funding
based on economic distress. Distressed areas include counties with low per capital income, high
poverty rates, or high unemployment. The Brownfields Site Cleanup Tax Credit program is
authorized to provide a total of $40 million in nonrefundable tax credits against the business or
personal income tax available for brownfield site cleanup. Under this program, applicants
cleaning up sites in economically distressed areas are eligible for a $750,000 or 15% tax credit,
whichever is less. Applicants cleaning up sites in non-distressed communities are eligible only
to receive $500,000 or 10% in tax credit. The Urban and Rural Initiative Grant program was
created to assist non-profit economic development organizations working in economically
disadvantaged areas. The program provided a maximum of $500,000 per grant award. Ohio's
Urban Redevelopment Loan program provides grants up to $500,000 for economically distressed
areas that meet at 25% local match requirement. Thus, in Ohio, programs that prioritize
brownfields sites for the purposes of allocating incentives are primarily based on the economic
conditions of the areas in which the brownfields are located. Incidentally, several of the state's
incentive programs have exhausted available funding due to demand for the programs.
Indiana
The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (INDEM) has established an
Environmental Remediation Revolving Loan Fund, which provides funds to local governments
for activities contributing to brownfields remediation. Funds are prioritized based on factors
such as the ability of the community to contribute money to the project, the property's new use,
the level of community support, and public outreach to the community. Applicants must show
"evidence of their intent to involve local residents and community organizations in the cleanup
process, and describe how cleanup efforts will create and sustain jobs (INDEM 2000)." The
INDEM has established targeted areas for funding based on poverty levels and inclusion in
federal brownfields programs.
2. Prioritization Primarily Based on Public Benefits of Redevelopment and Economic
Distress
Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Brownfields Law (Chapter 206 of the Acts of 1998) established several
different programs to encourage brownfields redevelopment, each with its own eligibility
requirements and approaches to prioritization. Massachusetts relies on a combination of eligibility
requirements and prioritization techniques to target incentives to projects that are located in
distressed areas and/or provide public benefits.
The Brownfields Redevelopment Fund (BRF) provides low-interest loans and grants for site
assessment and cleanup in Economically Distressed Areas (EDAs). The definition of EDAs is
complex, and based on a previously defined units known as Economic Target Areas (ETAs). In
essence, ETAs and EDAs include one or more contiguous census tracts with high unemployment,
low household income, high poverty rates, significant layoffs of workers or military base closings, or
high commercial vacancy rates (General Laws Of Massachusetts Chapter 23A: Section 3D). It turns
out that EDAs are quite inclusive, including part or all of 43% (150 of 351) of Massachusetts' cities
and towns, and covering diverse areas such as all of Boston and Cambridge (Massachusetts Office of
Business Development 1998, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1996). Proposed projects that
receive assistance from the BFR must be located in EDAs and must result in significant economic
impacts in terms of new jobs or contribution to the economic or physical revitalization of the area
(Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 1998).
The Brownfields Tax Credit encourages private sector investment in the cleanup of
contaminated sites in Economically Distressed Areas. A 25% tax credit is available upon completion
of site cleanup, and a 50% tax credit is available if the remediation exceeds minimum cleanup
requirements (Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 1998).
The Brownfields Covenant Not to Sue (CNTS) program is an alternative for parties who do
not qualify for the statutory liability relief provided in other parts of the law. Priority for these
covenants is given to projects in the 15 municipalities with the highest poverty rates, second to
projects located in other Economically Distressed Areas (EDA), and finally to sites in all other
municipalities (Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 1998). Projects eligible
under this program are those that contribute to the economic or physical revitalization of the
community in which the Site is located. In addition, each project must provide public benefits in the
form of new, permanent jobs; affordable housing benefits; historic preservation; open space; or some
other public benefit to the community as determined by the Attorney General (Massachusetts
Attorney General's Office 1999).
Oregon
In 1995, Oregon passed legislation to amend the state's cleanup law and encourage
redevelopment of brownfield sites. As a result of this legislation, the Oregon Brownfields
Funding Task Force was created. The Task Force recommended several criteria as guidelines for
reviewing applications for state funding, including (among others) return on public investment
and marketability. In addition, the Task Force recommended that sites located in economically
distressed communities be given special priority. In addition, the Task Force recommended that
projects be prioritized in part on the degree to which they are marketable or achieve a public
purpose.
Subsequent to the Task Force's recommendations, the Oregon legislature established a
brownfields redevelopment loan fund to provide financial assistance for environmental cleanups.
In making loans, the Economic and Community Development Department is required to
consider, among other factors, the extent to which the real or perceived environmental
contamination prevents utilization of the property, the degree to which redevelopment would
protect human health or the environment, and "the probability of the success of the intended use
or the degree to which redevelopment...provides a public purpose..." (Chapter 285A Oregon
Revised Statues 1999). Other proposed legislation in Oregon would establish a Brownfield
Redevelopment Pilot Program, that would, among other things, provide grants to redevelop
brownfields that had been identified through a community prioritization process. Grants would
be awarded based on the effectiveness of the community process in building support for
redevelopment, the need for public funds, whether the project would redevelop a disadvantaged
area and promote environmental justice, the likelihood that the redevelopment would function as
a catalyst for additional development, whether the project could create and retain jobs, and
whether the project would "maximize public benefit (69 1h Oregon Legislative Assembly 1997)."
New York
New York's current brownfields policies do not prioritize sites for redevelopment. This
is a problem according to Valerie Washington, Executive Director of the Albany-based group
Environmental Advocates because it allows for "cherry picking," that is, selecting the most
promising sites for redevelopment and leaving the rest. (Washington, personal communication,
April 2000) However, policy makers have proposed several new pieces of legislation to create
a system of incentives for developers working within designated land use opportunity areas
chosen by local communities. In one program, communities could apply for a $50,000 grant to
enable pre-planning for opportunity areas. Developers that work closely with community-based
organizations would receive priority for any financial incentives. Another bill would create
Brownfield Redevelopment Areas (BRAs), that have a poverty rates of at least 20% or
unemployment rates of at least 125% of the statewide unemployment rate (New York State
Legislature 2000). Municipalities conducting environmental remediation projects in a BRAs
would receive state incentives for environmental remediation and cleanup of off-site
groundwater contamination.
Regulations to further detail the criteria for brownfield opportunity zones and related
incentives have yet to be promulgated. Washington expects the regulations would prioritize sites
according to the degree to which they provided benefits to human health, the environment, and
the economy (in terms of creating new job opportunities). Additional factors for consideration in
prioritization would likely include local support for the project and the concentration of
brownfields within the area.
3. Prioritization Based on Site Marketability
New Jersey
The state brownfields legislation establishes a Brownfields Task Force which is charged,
among other things, with coordinating state policy on brownfields redevelopment and developing
an inventory of brownfields sites that is prioritized based on "immediate economic development
potential (Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act P.L. 1997)." New Jersey provides
both grants and loans to assist with site investigations and cleanup activities. A total of $55
million is available through the Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund. According to
JoAnne Patrizzo, New Jersey's Brownfields Program Director, although the legislation requires
prioritization based on economic development potential, in practice funds are usually granted on
a first-come, first-serve basis (personal communication, April 2000). This may produce roughly
the same results as prioritizing on a most-marketable-first strategy.
Texas
The Texas Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) provides administrative, technical, and
legal incentives to encourage brownfields cleanup and redevelopment. The state has instituted
liability relief for innocent owners, operators and lenders who did not cause or contribute to the
source or sources of contamination. Charles Fpperson of the Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission notes that the state targets funds towards redevelopment projects that
are economically viable (personal communication, April 2000). In addition, if a project is on a
tight timeline due to an imminent project closing date, then the project may receive priority for a
covenant not to sue. However, in Epperson's judgement, prioritization is not a large issue in
Texas, given that the state does not have a large backlog of sites waiting for covena'nts.
Public Benefits as a Factor for Prioritization
Although few of the states described above looked primarily to the public benefits of
brownfields projects as a means to target redevelopment incentives, public benefits was a
component of several state policies. For these states - New York, Massachusetts, and Oregon -
defining what is a public benefit and how benefits should be compared across sites can become
an important issue. For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General's office, which is charged
with implementing the covenant not to sue program under the state brownfields legislation, is
required to consider the public benefit of redevelopment projects applying for tailored liability
relief. Although the legislation provides general parameters of the dimensions of public benefits
that the Attorney General should consider, there are no specific measurements that can be used
across sites. This can become problematic as applicants try to stretch the definition of certain
public benefits to suit their private development objectives. For example, one project included
relatively moderately priced housing in a prosperous neighborhood as an "affordable housing
benefit." At the same time, dimensions of public benefit described in the legislation are far more
narrow than those actually provided by projects in the program. For example, some projects that
have been submitted to the covenant not to sue program would reopen public waterfront access
or reconfigure land uses to convert an industrial site sandwiched between residential lots into a
more compatible residential project. However, the legislation did not anticipate these benefits,
and it is up to the Attorney General's discretion to determine whether these public benefits fall
within the bounds of the legislative intent.
For those states that already consider the public benefits of brownfields redevelopment as
a factor for targeting incentives, the issue of how to define and evaluate the benefits of
brownfields projects is key to developing successful brownfields policies. The issue may be
even more critical for states that have not considered the prioritization issue. If a first-come,
first-serve approach results in a de facto preference for the most marketable sites, and if more
marketable sites are less likely to produce public benefits upon redevelopment, states may
inadvertently be loosing opportunities to reap public benefits from public investments. The
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relationship between marketability and public benefits has not been tested, and indeed cannot be
tested unless there is some common understanding of how to evaluating the public benefits of
brownfields redevelopment projects. I shall return to the question of how states might realign
their policies in order to better prioritize sites for redevelopment in the conclusions to this thesis.
For now, I consider how the public benefits of brownfields policies and projects been evaluated
to date.
C. EFFORTS TO DATE TO EVALUATE BROWNFIELD BENEFITS
Measuring the public benefits of brownfields is complicated. Projects vary vastly in their
objectives, degree of public involvement, and degree of environmental contamination.
Furthermore, state and local initiatives to promote brownfields differ widely in their approaches.
Given all this variation between brownfields projects and programs, is there a standard set of
metrics than can be used to measure the public benefits of brownfields redevelopment?
This question is further complicated because the evaluative metrics chosen imply a
certain definition of the goals of a project. In the case of brownfields redevelopment, different
stakeholders can have very distinct goals. Private, for-profit real estate developers involved in
brownfields redevelopment define successful brownfields projects in terms of acceptable profit
given certain levels of risk. Cities have a different perspective. For example, the President of
the U.S. Conference of Mayors speaks about successful brownfields redevelopment in terms of
economic vitality, utilizing existing infrastructure such as roads and sewer systems, and easing
the pressure to develop open spaces and farmland. Community groups and environmental
activists have a different focus. For example, the Citizens for Public Environmental Oversight
has suggested the following definition of success: "Brownfields projects are successful when
they improve public health and the environment, promote economic recovery without
"redlining," create ownership opportunities for the community, and/or enhance the quality of life
in targeted brownfields areas.... Members of the community (the residents and others most
affected by brownfields or revitalization), not project proponents, shall define success." ( 1999)
Despite the difficulties in measurement due to varied project types and goals, there have
been efforts to evaluate the benefits of brownfields redevelopment. However, these studies have
generally taken either a purely qualitative approach or a narrowly defined quantitative approach
to measuring benefits.
Numerous case studies have been written about brownfields redevelopment (Dennison
1998, Simons 1998a, Bartsch and Collaton 1997, Pepper 1997). Generally these case studies
include a qualitative description of the benefits of the project. These descriptions vary by case,
and are not organized into any standard or consistent format. One study developed a relatively
comprehensive list of the potential benefits and costs of brownfields redevelopment (Appendix
A) (Smart Growth Network 1996). This study, contracted by EPA's Office of Policy Planning
and Evaluation, while very useful in identifying potential benefits, does not suggest how the
degree of benefit provided might be evaluated. Thus, standardized, quantifiable measures are
still lacking for much of the broad range of potential benefits of brownfields redevelopment.
Several quantitative studies have been conducted to measure the benefits of brownfields
redevelopment, but these indicators of benefit are relatively narrow, compared to the full range
of possible benefits identified in the qualitative studies discussed above. For example, the
Federal EPA estimates that its brownfields pilot program has helped create more than 5,000 jobs
across the country and has leveraged more than $1.6 billion in funds for redevelopment
(Brownfields National Partnership 1999). The U.S. Conference of Mayors conducted a survey of
231 cities with regard to their brownfield properties and found that cities reported that
redeveloping their brownfields would collectively result in between $878 million and $2.4
billion in additional annual tax revenues, 550,000 new jobs, and capacity for 5.8 million new
people in the cities without adding new infrastructure. (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2000). The
Conference of Mayors also found that tax base growth, followed by job creation and
neighborhood revitalization, were among the most commonly expected benefits of brownfields
redevelopment (Table 2.) Neither the EPA or the U.S. Conference of Mayors suggest how their
metrics might be normalized to enable project-by-project comparisons of benefits provided.
Rather, they aggregate benefits across many projects, suggesting the potential for redevelopment
on a national scale.
Table 2. Expected Benefits of Brownfields Redevelopment from a Municipal Perspective
Potential Benefits of Brownfields Redevelopment
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Tax Base Growth 86%
Job Creation
Neighborhood Revitalization / '/%
Environmental Protection 53% EPercent of CitiesEnvionmetal rotetionExpecting Potential
Infrastructure Utilization 35% Benefit from
Open Space Preservation/Curbing Sprawl Brownfields
Rdovolopmont
Source: A National Report on Brownfields Redevelopment, United States Conference of Mayors, February 2000
A more detailed project-level study on the benefits of brownfields redevelopment was
published by the Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED) in 1999. CUED's explicit
goal was to focus on the economic development impacts of brownfields redevelopment. The
authors developed two benchmarks (i.e. discrete, measurable elements) to evaluate a broad
variety of projects in terms of their economic benefit. These benchmarks are powerful in that
they can be used to measure the impact of a wide variety of projects, and they are relatively
simple to compute and understand. CUED measured public cost per job created in each project
and private sector funds leveraged per dollar of public investment for each project. The authors
concluded that the median public cost per job created was $14,003, and that the median leverage
for a typical2 project was $2.48 (that is each dollar of public sector funds invested generated
$2.48 in private sector spending on the project).
2 This figure excludes projects that resulted in a public cultural or recreational redevelopment use.
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While these figures are impressive and the CUED's benchmarks are elegantly simple,
they ultimately measure only limited dimensions of public benefit that could be produced from
brownfields redevelopment. A report published by the Center for Public Environmental
Oversight (CPEO) & the Urban Habitat Program (UHP) in 1998 stressed that the most common
measures of public benefit from brownfields projects can neglect the impact of a project on the
local neighborhood. "The traditional paradigm of 'success' is defined by government agencies
as the 1) number of jobs created, 2) amount of money leveraged, and 3) tax revenue created.
Evaluations using this paradigm are unable to show how a project benefited the people who were
negatively affected by the brownfield property in the first place." Environmental justice and
community advocates argue that evaluations of brownfields projects should measure the benefits
that the project provides to the local community, not just project proponents. "Success cannot be
merely defined in terms of dollars and cents. Rather it should be judged by the effectiveness of a
community's ability to drive and benefit from the redevelopment process." (CPEO and UHP
1998).
One CPEO staff member suggested that brownfields projects that require public subsidies
be evaluated on many dimensions (Siegel 1999). Proposals for brownfields projects requesting
public investment would be evaluated on the degree each project would:
- involve the local community in planning
- protect public health
= generate local jobs and business
- provide needed services or housing for the community
- expand open space or otherwise improve the local quality of life
- generate additional tax revenues for local agencies
- retain the existing community and its cultural base
m provide any of the above in a particularly blighted area
To date there is no generally accepted method for evaluating this broader class of public
benefits of brownfields redevelopment. CUED's rationale for focusing solely on economic
development impacts may be indicative of the general reluctance to quantify the spectrum of
public benefits created by brownfields redevelopment. First, CUED considers environmental
and social dimensions of brownfields redevelopment to be more difficult to measure than
economic impacts. Second, CUED notes that economic development is often cited as a primary
goal of brownfields redevelopment. Third, data on economic benefits are often used by
legislators and policy makers as a basis for allocating funding between projects and for
measuring project success. Finally, as CUED states, "economic statistics are often seen as more
rigorous than qualitative measures, which are often discounted as mere subjective
pronouncements." Although CUED did briefly describe environmental and social benefits of the
projects, there was no standardized method of evaluating these benefits.
While this rationale for limiting its project scope is understandable, there is a need for
additional quantifiable benchmarks that address additional dimensions of brownfields
redevelopment. Meaningful benchmarks must reflect the primary goals and desired outcomes of
a brownfields program. While job creation and leveraging private investment are primary goals
in many projects, other projects have primarily social or environmental goals, or focus on other
dimensions of economic benefit, such as increasing utilization of existing infrastructure or
providing jobs specifically to local residents.
Brownfields policies are new and experimental. Even the most established federal and
state brownfields programs have been in existence only for a few years. The wide variety of
approaches to establishing incentives for redevelopment reflects the experimental nature of these
policies: each jurisdiction is in effect a test case, and the most successful approaches will only
become evident as more projects are completed. Therefore, it is important to monitor the success
of brownfields projects and policies in order to provide a feedback mechanism for policy
evaluation and improvement. One way to monitor the success of brownfields policies it to
develop benchmarks that reflect the broad array of public benefits that have been invoked as the
rationale for promoting brownfields redevelopment. Standardized benchmarks that can be
applied across state lines could enable a comprehensive evaluation of the success of brownfields
policies individually and as a whole in making progress toward stated policy objectives.
CHAPTER III: CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
In order to examine the public benefits resulting from brownfields development, I used a
case study approach. I researched five brownfields projects in order to identify the goals of the
project and the expected and realized outcomes. These cases were chosen from the list of 107
cases reviewed in the CUED report. I chose to use the CUED data because they represented a
selection of completed brownfields projects for which there were baseline data. CUED states
that it selected only those cases that were complete3 from communities that were known to have
an active involvement in brownfields redevelopment, as defined by the CUED authors. CUED
notes that this selection criteria produced a non-random sample of projects. There are two
sources of bias in CUED's case selection. First, the population of host communities was limited
to those known by the report's authors to be active in brownfields redevelopment. Second,
selecting only completed projects means that any unsuccessful projects (i.e. those that were not
completed) would be excluded from the population of cases. The exclusion of failed projects is
probably the more serious source of bias in the case selection. However, for the purposes of this
study, I am not trying to estimate the degree of public benefits provided through brownfields
projects (i.e. the results), but rather to determine the appropriate measures of public benefits (i.e.
the evaluative techniques). Therefore, it will be most useful to examine projects that were
completed, because presumably only completed projects would provide public benefits.
Once I identified the CUED cases as my population from which to choose cases, I
selected a sample of case studies. My goal in case selection was to choose one case for each of
several different types of brownfield project, and to chose the most "typical" case within the
type. For the purposes of this study, I divided the types of brownfield projects in terms of
categories of re-use. Thus, the five types of brownfields projects that I examined included
industrial, commercial/office, public cultural/recreational, residential, and office reuses. The
reuse types represent the most frequent reuse types among those listed in the CUED study. For
mixed use classifications I categorized the project with the primary type of reuse. There are
many other possible types of categorizations of brownfields that one could choose in selecting
cases. For example, it would be possible to divide brownfields into type of location or nearby
zoning code (e.g. industrial, residential, commercial, or waterfront). Other categorizations could
be based on city size, degree of contamination, or size of the property. In this case, I decided to
categorize brownfields by type of reuse because I assumed that the public benefits resulting from
a project might vary more with the type of reuse than with the other factors just mentioned.
However, I have not tested this assumption, and it represents a potential source of bias in my
case selection.
Once I had selected the categories of brownfields cases, I wanted to choose the most
typical case within the category to serve as a case study. For the purposes of this study, I chose
three variables which I would use to assess the degree to which a project was typical. These
were: 1) remediation costs as a percentage of total project costs, 2) percent of population within
a one-mile radius of the site below the poverty line, and 3) public funds as a percentage of total
3 Although CUED stated it selected only completed project, in fact one of the cases I chose from their selection
turned out to be not yet complete, as defined by the city brownfields coordinator. In this case the project had
encountered unexpected delays, but was nearing completion.
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funding for the project. I chose these variables as surrogates for the degree of contamination at
the site, the economic distress of the neighborhood, and the degree of public subsidy for the
project, respectively. In my judgement these factors are important variables for describing the
project, although other variables (e.g. property size, type of neighborhood, etc.) could have been
chosen. All data for the variables were taken from the CUED report.
Once I had the data for each variable, within each type of brownfield reuse, I calculated
the median value for the variable within each group. I then calculated the squared deviation
from the median for each property for each variable, and then summed across all variables for
each property. I defined the property with the lowest sum of squared deviations within each
group as the most typical project within that group. Unfortunately, three of the five selected
cases selected with this methodology turned out to be within the same city: Emeryville
California. In order to avoid having the results dominated by characteristics specific to
Emeryville, I chose the next most typical project for two of the three project types where the
initial project chosen was within Emeryville. Through this process I selected my initial case
studies. Once I began to research these cases, it became clear that one project could not be the
subject of a case study because the project proponent wanted to avoid publicity for the project,
and so the city brownfields coordinator was unwilling to discuss the case and asked that I not
include it in my research. Therefore, for that category I chose the next most typical project. The
final case studies selected are shown in Table 1.
Reuse Type Case Study Remediation as a Percent of Public Funds as a
Percentage of Residents in a One Percentage of
Project Costs Mile Radius Total
Below Poverty
Line
Industrial CSX/EHOB 2.59% 26.5% 13.0%
Office FMC Technology 3.82% 28.5% 6.0%
Center
Retail East Baybridge 7.85% 24.0% 5.0%
Recreational - Blockbuster Sony 6.21% 32.2% 45.0%
Cultural Center
Housing Westheimer 3.90% 35.3% 0.3%
Rigging
Once I had selected cases, I determined case contacts by using EPA's information on
their Brownfields Pilot Projects. Almost all cases are located within EPA pilot cities, though
most projects are not themselves pilot projects. I conducted telephone interviews with case
contacts and those individuals who they identified as representing key interests in the project.
The interview protocol was designed to identify the context and goals of the project, perceived
benefits of the project, and perceptions of what would have occurred if the project had not
proceeded (See Interview Protocol, Appendix B). In some cases, if an interviewee claimed to be
familiar with only one aspect of the project, I would cover only the appropriate sections of the
interview protocol. For example, if an environmental official offered that (s)he had no
knowledge of economic or social dimensions of the project, I would skip the relevant sections of
the interview protocol. A total of nineteen contacts were interviewed for the five cases. The
average interview took 24 minutes. No interviews were directly declined, although I was unable
to contact several people who had been identified by other interviewees but who were frequently
away from their offices.
In order to supplement the interviews with case contacts, I collected information on the
history of the project and the characteristics of the neighborhood where the project took place.
(e.g. demographics and neighborhood environmental characteristics). Using these data and the
results of the interview, I compiled case studies that identified goals of the brownfields project
and impacts on the surrounding neighborhood.
Once I compiled case studies, I examined the cases for common goals and benefits. For
each area of commonality, I considered how the benefits had or had not been evaluated within
the traditional brownfields benchmarks. Based on this analysis, I recommended areas of public
benefit where future benchmarks should be developed.
CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDIES4
CASE I: WESTHEIMER RIGGING
SITE HISTORY
For many years, the 2.7 acre site at 117 Eastwood Street in Houston was known
locally as the "East End Dump." The property, which was close to a railroad and a
shipping channel, had once been used by the Westheimer Rigging company as a truck
maintenance yard. The company gradually expanded its facilities by buying up adjacent
residential properties and paving over them. Property values in the largely residential
area had plummeted, and there were several near-accidents involving local children and
the company's eighteen-wheeler trucks.
In 1979, the Goldberg family, who owned Westheimer Rigging, closed its
operation and abandoned 117 Eastwood Street and its two buildings. The property was
not secured with a fence. Consequently, in the seventeen years following the closure,
illegal dumpers piled trash and debris onto the property. No one was quite sure what was
being dumped there, and as the years wore on local residents became concerned that the
debris might include environmental contaminants and hazardous waste. Residents
became more concerned when a local girl was almost kidnapped on the premises. Local
residents and community-based organizations contacted the property owners and
informed them that they would face neighborhood opposition and perhaps legal
challenges unless something were done to clean up and secure the property.
In 1995, the Goldberg family contacted several local community development
corporations to see if any would be interested in accepting the property as a donation.
Most of the local groups viewed the property more as a liability than an asset, however
one group, the Latino Learning Center (LLC), was seeking a place to develop affordable
housing for senior citizens and a community center. The LLC agreed to consider
accepting the property if the owners would assist in cleaning up the debris. As a first
step, the LLC secured a grant to cover the cost of an environmental assessment, and then
convinced the owners to allow access to the property to enable the environmental
assessment to proceed. After much negotiation, the owners signed a written agreement to
grant the land to the LLC.
After Westheimer Rigging signed the agreement to donate the land, the LLC
obtained a commitment letter from HUD for $3.8 million Section 202 loan to develop the
property. At that time, the owners tried to re-negotiate selling the property, but they had
already agreed to donate the land to LLC. Since the owners wanted to dispose of the
property quickly, they allowed the Phase I assessment to proceed and agreed to enter the
Texas Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP). The Phase I environmental assessment called
for removal of the debris and the buildings. After the Phase I assessment, the owners and
4 Unless otherwise noted, information is drawn from interviews with the contacts listed at the end of each
case study.
the LLC renegotiated the terms of the transfer. Ultimately, the owners paid $150,000
into the project to contribute to the costs of cleanup. Site cleanup began in March of
1998, and on April 2 of that year the site entered into the Texas VCP. Cleanup was
completed on April 20, 1998. The first phase of redevelopment is scheduled to be
completed in the fall of 2000. A second phase of redevelopment is also expected.
POLICY CONTEXT
The Westheimer Rigging site was remediated under the Texas Voluntary Cleanup
Program (VCP). The VCP provides administrative, technical, and legal incentives to
parties who bear no responsibility for environmental contamination at the site. The VCP
provides prospective lenders and landowners with a streamlined cleanup process and
liability protection. The only requirement for parties applying to enter the VCP is that the
site is not subject to an order or permit from the Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) or subject to a TNRCC enforcement action.
Applicants must agree to abide by a cleanup schedule and pay for all VCP
oversight costs. After satisfactory completion of the cleanup, applicants receive a
certificate of completion from the TNRCC, which states that all innocent parties are
released from liability to the state for cleanup of areas covered by the certificate.
In addition to the VCP, another important factor of the policy context for the
Westheimer Rigging site is that Houston has no zoning code or local land use restrictions.
As one city official stated, there is a de facto zoning system because any project is subject
to local protest and outcry if it does not meet community expectations. However, a
representative of the LLC decried the lack of a zoning system because it allows
incompatible land uses to exist side by side, and does not prevent polluting or otherwise
disruptive businesses from purchasing and occupying parcels adjacent to residential
properties. The lack of zoning controls can degrade property values and lead to public
health problems. The ultimate result of such regulation can be disinvestment and
property abandonment when residents have the economic means to move, or exaggerated
injustices for those residents who can not move away from undesirable land uses.
The Westheimer Rigging project was the first brownfields site to occur under the
oversight of the Mayor's Land Redevelopment Advisory Committee. A member of the
LLC's board was appointed to the Mayor's Committee. Since that board member was
familiar with LLC's plans for the site, he was able to help identify funding from the
federal EPA to assist with the site assessment.
The project also benefited from inclusion in the city's consolidated plan for
disbursement of HUD funding. At that time, Houston was receiving approximately $50
million in Community Development Block Grants and other funds from HUD. When the
current administration came into office the Mayor personally became a proponent of the
project, and the administration adopted the Westheimer Rigging project as one of 20
housing projects that would receive mayoral support. This endorsement reduced some of
the bureaucratic requirements for the project proponents.
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NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
The Westheimer Rigging property falls within the East End neighborhood of
Houston, and is on the center of Census tract 301.01 in Houston (American Fact Finder
2000) The census tract income level is classified as "moderate," with 1999 estimated
median family income of $28,121. Census data for 1990 indicate that there are 4859
residents living in the tract, 93.9% of whom are Hispanic. In 1990 there were a total of
1491 housing units in the census tract, 51.9% of which were occupied by renters, and
13.2% of which were vacant. The median age of the housing stock is 46 years. Within a
one-mile radius of the site, 35.3% percent of the population is below the poverty line.
The East End has seen tremendous growth in its elderly population in recent years. The
LLC conducted a market survey documenting 6,000 elderly residents who would qualify
for affordable housing benefits within a 5-mile radius of the project.
The census tract hosts eleven different hazardous waste handlers (EnviroMapper
2000) . The entire census tract and adjacent tracts fall within a federal Brownfields Tax
Incentive Zone and enterprise community area.
Business conditions were in a steady decline in the five years before the
Westheimer Rigging project. The oil bust had significantly influenced the neighborhood,
and many locally owned small retail stores were closing.
Aside from the Westheimer Rigging project, there was one other significant
project in the East End neighborhood. This was also a brownfields project
redevelopment, located at 5245 Polk Street, which brought in a new industrial park, state
offices, and state supported housing.
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVOLVED IN REDEVELOPMENT
The process of redeveloping the Westheimer Rigging site included over 30
stakeholder groups. Five key players were: 1) the LLC as the development entity, 2) the
Mayor's Office of Environmental Policy, 3) the Mayor's Land Redevelopment Advisory
Committee, 4) the TNRCC, and 5) the East End Chamber of Commerce.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION AND REMEDIATION
Site contamination included general trash and debris, as well as low levels of
hydrocarbons, metals, and arsenic in the soil and groundwater. The site also contained
leaking underground storage tanks, which were removed during cleanup. Contaminated
soil was excavated and removed. Groundwater on the site has not been actively treated,
but contamination is expected to decline through natural attenuation. Institutional
controls were put in place to prevent pumping of groundwater, which in turn is expected
to prevent the "smearing" of the plume of groundwater pollution.
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
The LLC planned to develop 65 supportive, affordable housing units for senior
citizens. The plan also includes a community center, laundromat, and other amenities to
support the housing units. The property provides parking for 1.5 cars per housing unit.
The property is landscaped, and curbs and street lights have been replaced by the city
after previous owners removed these amenities to facilitate truck access. The
redevelopment plan has also incorporated a rails-to-trails conversion for an abandoned
railroad right-of-way that runs through the property. The city obtained funding to
complete the rails-to-trails project, and the LLC purchased the right of way and plans to
maintain the property.
PROJECT GOALS
The city official interviewed described the central goal of the project as reusing
the property in a way that was beneficial to the community. It was important to the city
that the right kind of reuse exist on the site. In this case, community advocates defined
the desired reuse type and drove the development process.
Primary project goals encompassed social, environmental, and economic benefits.
Primary social benefits included improving neighborhood appearances and providing
community services and housing. Environmental goals included reducing community
health risks, protecting groundwater, and reducing urban sprawl. Economic goals
included creating jobs for local residents, improving business conditions in the




The project has provided more than 150 temporary construction jobs, as well as
eleven permanent jobs that will support the elderly housing development. The project
does not provide tax benefits to the city, as the LLC is a non-profit organization and has
made a 40-year commitment to operate the property as a non-profit to service seniors.
Project proponents believe that the development has increased property values in the
area, although this assertion was not borne out by local tax assessors' records, which
show no change in property values in the area. In any case, two new houses have been
built across the street from the site, and the LLC has put pressure on local landlords to
improve maintenance of rental properties. In addition, local homeowners have benefited
from HUD entitlement grants to support home improvement from qualified owners.
Spillover economic effects have included improved business conditions and increased
investment. According to project proponents, the redevelopment has reduced
abandonment of housing and businesses and is beginning to be a focal point for renewal.
For example, homeowners are painting their houses and upgrading surrounding
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properties. The LLC has had several meetings with the committee that oversees the
city's capital improvement fund. That committee had previously neglected the area near
the project, but now the city is providing capital improvement funding to upgrade and
replace curbs, gutters, streetlights, and sidewalks. The rails-to-trails program has
converted the underutilized rail infrastructure into a productive recreational use.
Environmental Benefits:
There have been no studies monitoring environmental exposures or characterizing
environmental health endpoints. However, the project did include measures designed to
protect local groundwater protection and reduce public health risks. The project has
indirectly improved open space through the rails-to-trails conversion. Although those
interviewed believe that the project has reduced pressure for urban sprawl, they note that
that impact is not observable.
Social Benefits:
A major benefit of the project has been its effect in helping to slow disinvestment
in the neighborhood. The East End has lost much of its housing stock as homeowners
abandon their small (50 by 100 foot) lots. There are over 70 such vacant lots within one
mile of the project. Owners often become delinquent on taxes, and no one will purchase
the properties because they are too small, the housing stock is old, and potential owners
do not want to pay the back taxes. The pattern of disinvestment and deterioration is
continuing, and the problem of absentee landlords who do not keep up the properties
remains a challenge. Despite continued disinvestment, redevelopment of the Westheimer
Rigging site has removed one neighborhood's liabilities, and has encouraged some
reinvestment by local residents.
In addition to improvements in the project neighborhood, the success of the
project has contributed to increased community organizing capacity in the broader region.
LLC representatives have made presentations before church and neighborhood groups
around the city, and have educated other communities about how to deal with
contaminated sites, particularly those that are not severely contaminated but face
problems of environmental stigma. In this way, community empowerment has been a
significant result of the project.
No negative impacts of the project were identified in the course of case
interviews, however, the redevelopment is not yet complete.
SOURCES OF FUNDS 5
Public Sources Amount
(1996 $)
EPA Pilot Grant 13,800
Publicly Supported Debt
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Renovation and Equipment 155,655
Total Uses 4,278,855
TRADITIONAL METRICS6
Permanent Job Creation 11
Public cost per job created $1,255
Tax Base Increase 0
Leverage of Private Funds 309.1
per Public Dollar Invested
Corporation (associated with LLC)
Byron Ellington
Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission
5 All financial figures cited are drawn from the
Council for Urban Economic Development,
Brownfields Redevelopment Performance
Evaluation, 1999. Job creation figures were
drawn from interviews.
6 Figures for this site could be calculated two
different ways, depending on whether publicly
supported debt is considered part of public or
private funding sources. Figures in the table
include the debt as part of private costs, however
if the debt were considered as a part of public
costs, the following data would result:
public cost/job = $346,709, leverage of private
funds per public dollar invested = 0.12.
Westheimer Rigging Site, 117 Eastwood Street, Houston
CASE 2: BLOCKBUSTER SONY ENTERTAINMENT CENTER
SITE HISTORY
Since the end of World War II, Camden, New Jersey has been in decline. The
city once hosted the factories of RCA and Campbell Soup Company, as well as multiple
shipyards along the Delaware River. But manufacturing facilities began moving out of
Camden in the 1950s, and as jobs relocated so did much of the city's population. In the
1960s Camden experienced racial tension and riots, and since that time conditions have
only worsened. In 1998, Camden was ranked as the fifth-poorest city in the nation, as
measured by per capita income (Kocieniewski 1998). The city has been plagued with a
host of social and economic ills: poverty, crime, abandonment, insufficient tax revenues,
deteriorating infrastructure, and political scandal (Kocieniewski 1998, Mansnerus 2000).
The Camden waterfront is within sight of Philadelphia, but the city remained
economically and psychologically isolated from its larger neighbor. According to one
long-time resident, "The only thing that ever brought [white suburbanites] to Camden
was jury duty." Isolation and the city's negative image stymied efforts to encourage
investment in Camden.
Throughout the 1980s, the City of Camden, along with the State of New Jersey
and local corporate landowners, took steps to try to revitalize the city through
improvement of its waterfront district along the Delaware River. In 1983, the city began
to develop a Waterfront Master Plan in order to determine how the waterfront could be
used as a means to entice private investment to Camden (New Jersey Economic
Development Authority 1996). The City of Camden, RCA, and the Campbell Soup
Company jointly commissioned a planning study to consider how the waterfront could be
redeveloped. The result of the planning effort was the creation of Cooper's Ferry
Development Association (Cooper's Ferry), a private non-profit corporation with ties to
business leaders and a mission to revitalize Camden's downtown waterfront. The New
Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA) has played an active role in
promoting development on the waterfront. Other projects in the area have included
construction of the New Jersey State Aquarium, Wiggins Park (a baseball stadium),
Penn's Landing Ferry Service to Philadelphia, and various infrastructure improvements
including a parking garage and extension of Delaware Avenue.
The Blockbuster Sony Entertainment Center (the E-Center) grew out of a
partnership between the NJEDA, which owns the property, Cooper's Ferry, which
developed the site, and the Pavilion Partners7 , who lease the property and operate the E-
Center. The project first came together in 1993 and was put on a fast track to open for its
first concert season in 1995. Informal agreements and strategic remediation procedures
speeded up the procedure of obtaining development permits and approvals from local,
county and state agencies (New Jersey Economic Development Authority 1996). For
example, the NJEDA removed and disposed of contaminated soils prior to formal
7 Blockbuster, Sony Music, and PACE Entertainment are the parent companies for Pavilion Partners.
approval from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. In addition, a
contract with a private tenant on the site enabled the NJEDA to demolish buildings and
remove asbestos before gaining formal site control. Finally, the NJEDA established site
control on the primary leasehold tract, and held this land while it assembled critical
adjacent parcels. In all of these actions, the NJEDA took on significant levels of risk in
order to facilitate the project.
POLICY CONTEXT
Camden and Philadelphia share a joint designation as a Federal Economic
Empowerment Zone, and Camden falls within a Brownfields Tax Incentive Zone
(American Fact Finder 2000). The State of New Jersey provides low interest loans,
incremental tax abatements, and tax rebates for up to 75% of cleanup costs sites within
designated Environmental Opportunity Zones, which are chosen by municipalities. The
state also offers a 25% matching grant program for qualified persons for innovative
technology cleanups and for cleanups that do not require significant use restrictions.
However, none of these incentives were used for the E-Center, which was completed
under the standard procedures of the economic development agency.
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
The E-Center exists in a largely industrial area, with residential neighborhoods a
few blocks to the east and north of the site. The closest residential neighbors live in the
Royal Court housing development, a large low-income housing project. Royal court
encompasses approximately 100 rental units that have recently undergone renovations
and are being converted into fee-simple ownership. The Lanning Square neighborhood
several blocks to the east of the E-Center has experienced considerable depopulation over
the last 30 to 40 years, as people and businesses moved out of the area and buildings were
demolished. Additional waterfront attractions, including the New Jersey Aquarium and
the Wiggins baseball stadium, have been developed to the north of the E-Center. The
South Jersey Port Corporation owns much of the industrial land south of the E-Center,
where there is some talk of converting underutilized lots and warehouses into surface
parking for the E-Center.
The E-Center lies in the north-central section of census tract 6005 in Camden.
The tract is largely industrial. There are twelve point sources of hazardous waste, six
sources of air releases, one site with discharges to water, and ten multiple sources of
waste (EnviroMapper 2000). More than half (55.34%) of the census tract's 815 residents
have incomes below the poverty line (American FactFinder). Estimated median family
income for the tract for 1999 was $18,465, up from $13,917 in 1990. Over three-quarters
(77.4%) of the population is African-American, and 19% of the population is Hispanic.
Of the 594 housing units in the tract, 64.9% are renter occupied and 22.7% are vacant.
The median age of the housing stock is 20 years. For the city of Camden as a whole,
unemployment was 14% in 1998, down from 20% in 1996.
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVOLVED IN REDEVELOPMENT
Redevelopment efforts included business leaders, and state and local officials.
Local residents were not extensively involved in the redevelopment plans.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION AND REMEDIATION
The majority of the contamination on the property was associated with historic fill
(cinders and ashes). Given the historic nature of the contaminants, the developers were
not held to be responsible for cleanup. The primary contaminants of concern were lead,
petroleum hydrocarbons, and naphthalene in the soil, and possibly also copper. The DEP
conducted tests to identify hotspots of high contaminant concentrations. Then the project
proponents developed a site-specific cleanup plan, and remediated and removed soils in
the hot spots.
The only groundwater issues in the case were associated with the high levels of
lead in the soil. There was concern that the lead could migrate from the soil into the
groundwater and then discharge into the Delaware River. Both shallow and deep
groundwater were monitored for several years. However, more recently, refined
sampling techniques have shown that lead on the site is not contaminating the
groundwater.
Final site remediation included both engineering solutions (caps) and institutional
controls. The caps on the property, which include the parking lot and amphitheater
building, prevent human exposure to the contaminated soil and also prevent infiltration of
surface water, thus minimizing concern about further groundwater contamination.
The deed to the property includes restrictions requiring that before any future
redevelopment on the property the project proponent will have to come back to the DEP
to get a review of a plan. Until that happens, the NJ DEP considers the case closed.
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
The E-Center is an essential component of an overall waterfront revitalization
strategy focused on cultural and entertainment and recreational attractions linked to
Philadelphia. The focus market for the project extends up to 50 miles from the site, and
is targeted towards the Philadelphia suburbs, central and northern New Jersey, and
Delaware (MRA International 1999). The area currently hosts 1.3 million visitors a year,
and that figure is expected to grow to 6-8 million per year (Coopers Ferry Development
Association, date unknown). The area recently was won bid to berth the historic
battleship New Jersey, which will serve as a museum and tourist attraction.
Initially the Pavilion Partners had conceived of the project as a seasonal concert
venue, however government officials and the South Jersey Performing Arts Center
wanted the center to remain open year-round so that it might serve as a greater catalyst
for waterfront activities in all seasons. The E-Center was ultimately designed to include
movable partitions and curtains that enable indoor winter performances, providing space
for up to 25,000 patrons (Coopers Ferry Development Association, date unknown).
PROJECT GOALS
A major goal of the E-Center project was to enhance Camden's reputation and
visibility within the region (Associated Press 1995). In addition, the state and city
officials hoped that the development would create jobs and supportive business activity
such as restaurants and nightclubs in the area. Local residents also hoped that the project
would create a significant number of jobs, although it was understood that the majority of
the jobs would be seasonal.
PROJECT BENEFITS/IMPACTS
Social Benefits
A primary benefit of the project has been its positive impact on the image of
Camden as a tourist attraction. There have been no substantial incidents of crime at the
E- Center, and this positive track record has helped to counter negative perceptions of
Camden. Whereas outsiders once believed the adage, "Whatever you do, don't stop in
Camden," perceptions have changed. The E-Center now hosts hundreds of thousands of
visitors each year.
There has also been a moderate increase in community organizing capacity in the
area as a result of the project, according to a representative for the state economic
development agency. The appearances of the site area have improved substantially with
the completion of the project and extension of the waterfront walkway to the site, but
there have been no noticeable improvement of residential areas surrounding the project.
Economic Benefits
The project may have opened the way for additional investment in the area, but to
date this development has remained largely focused on tourists and visitors from outside
Camden. The state economic development agency is currently negotiating with potential
developers of a retail shopping area and luxury apartments. However, there have not
been investments in restaurants or other local economic development spin-off effects.
One project, a restaurant and nightclub with retail businesses on the first few floors, had
been envisioned for the lot between the E-Center and the boat basin marina, but financing
for that project fell through. Some say the area has not yet reached a critical mass of
development for tourist and leisure activities in order to support small, local businesses
catering to the tourist trade. It may just be a matter of time and effort before the
emerging cluster of large-scale projects on the waterfront create a more complete fabric
of small businesses and locally driven development. At a minimum, the E-Center project
has prevented further abandonment of housing and businesses in the area.
One could argue that the concept of the E-Center is not designed to promote
supporting business development in the area. For example, refreshments, while
expensive, are available within the E-Center, and parking is adjacent to the site. There
are few connections between the waterfront area and the commercial areas of downtown
Camden. Visitors have little reason to patronize local businesses on their way to or from
a concert. Most restaurants are located five blocks from the center, with little in the form
of attraction in between, and many local restaurants are only open in daytime hours. The
employees of the center do patronize local restaurants, and pizza sales are apparently up
for one local restaurant due to orders from E-Center staff.
While job creation was touted as a major benefit of the project, and in fact there
are 515 jobs that were created as a result of the project, the benefits of those jobs to local
residents has been minimal. The vast majority of the jobs are seasonal, part-time,
minimum-wage jobs. Initially, the Pavilion Partners recruited local residents to fill these
positions, but they encountered difficulties retaining those workers. Most of the current
workers at the E-Center are teenagers hailing from the suburbs.
The E-Center does not pay taxes, as the land is owned by the state. The site
managers, Pavilion Partners, will make a Payment in Lieu of Taxes of $23 million over
30 years. One interviewee, who was not a city official, claimed that this benefit to the
city would not begin until ten years after project completion, however that claim was
unconfirmed. In any case, some residents have expressed concern that the city gave too
large a subsidy to the project's private proponents, and that the city should receive more
in the way of direct benefits from the project.
Environmental Benefits
The project has improved neighborhood appearances along the waterfront and at
the grounds, and thus has enhanced the accessibility and desirability of open space in the
area.
Negative Project Impacts:
The project has created a significant increase in local traffic during concerts, and
has made it difficult for residents to travel across the traffic flow created by the visitors.
At times, residents experience substantial difficulties leaving their apartment buildings
due to traffic congestion. Elder residents have complained of lewd behavior and drug use
among concert goers in parking lots adjacent to residential buildings.
In addition to the immediate concerns about the project impacts, there is a broader
sense among some Camden residents that the project and the city's waterfront
development as a whole have absorbed much of the political attention for improvement in
Camden. There is a feeling among some that the downtown and waterfront areas have
profited at the expense of the neighborhoods. However, others argue that the downtown
development will ultimately benefit the neighborhoods, and that the two areas are not in
opposition.
SOURCES OF FUNDS 8
Public Sources Amount (1996 $)
South Jersey Performing Arts Center (state funded) 11,100,000
HUD 4,000,000
South Jersey Port Corporation 3,000,000
Casino Reinvestment Development Authority 3,000,000
Camden County Improvement Authority 2,500,000
NJ Urban Development 2,000,000
Total Public Sources 25,600,000
Private Sources
Pavilion Partners 31,000,000
Total Sources9  56,600,000
Uses of Fund 0
Activity Amount (1996 $)
Site Preparation (including remediation, shoreline re-stabilization) 8,900,000
Site Acquisition (includes cost of business relocations and lease 9,000,000
compensations)
Construction 31,000,000
Renovation and Equipment 10,500,000
Total Uses 59,400,000
TRADITIONAL METRICS
Permanent Job Creation 500 seasonal,
15 full time
8 Source of data is 1996 CUED National Economic Development Partnership Award Submittal, submitted
by New Jersey Economic Development Authority June 4, 1996
9 Note: Sources and uses of funds do not equate; this may be due to different sources of data. CUED lists
sources of funds as $56.4 million, but does not fully detail each source contribution.
1O Source: Council for Urban Economic Development, Brownfields Redevelopment Performance
Evaluation, 1999.
" Source: Council for Urban Economic Development, Brownfields Redevelopment Performance
Evaluation, 1999.
Leverage of Private Funds per Public Dollar Invested 1.2
Tax Base Increase (in the form of a Payment-In-Lieu-Of -Taxes 766,666/yr
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CASE III: EAST BAYBRIDGE
SITE HISTORY
Emeryville, just east of San Francisco, is a small city with a long industrial
history. The city was developed at the turn of the century as a regional center for
transportation and manufacturing. However, in the latter part of the century, and
particularly in three recessions between 1978 and 1995, industries seeking cheaper land
and labor, less crime, better distribution and friendlier government abandoned the city. In
1995, approximately 385 of Emeryville's 780 acres were zoned for commercial uses,
including industrial and mixed-uses (Dayrit 1998). Of this commercial acreage, 60.77%
was vacant or under-utilized, and 55% was known to have soil and groundwater
contamination. The preponderance of brownfields sites in Emeryville also resulted in the
loss of over $13 million in tax revenues and 650 jobs between 1990 and 1995 (Dayrit
1998).
The 25-acre East Baybridge property, owned by the Santa Fe Railroad, was once
the site of railroads, warehouses and a truck depot, but by the 1980s the property had
been abandoned. The site crossed the jurisdictions of both Emeryville and the adjacent
city of Oakland. The two cities worked together to develop an urban design process to
lay out development guidelines and identify specific land uses that would be encouraged.
Emeryville and Oakland established a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) to oversee the
development process. Emeryville took a lead role in coordinating redevelopment, and the
entire Emeryville City council served on the JPA, along with three Oakland city council
members.
In order to encourage redevelopment on the property, Emeryville incorporated the
East Baybridge site into its EPA Brownfields Pilot program. The city initiated a master
planning process, featuring a series of workshops with the planning commission to scope
out possible land uses. The process also included a series of public meetings, culminating
in a presentation before city council. The city concluded that creating a retail center to
serve the neighborhood would meet a primary goal of residents. The result of the
workshop then served as guidance for the developer.
At the same time, the city was suing the California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans), the state transportation agency charged with building a new Cypress Freeway
that passes by the site. After winning a court-ordered injunction, the city won a
settlement with Caltrans for $10 million to assist in building a $27 million road and
bridge project that could carry traffic from the freeway onto San Pablo Avenue, thus
serving the East Baybridge development (Matier 1994). The City also negotiated the
purchase and remediation of a contaminated gasoline station, whose future use as a road
was a prerequisite to opening the Center.
The developer, Catellus Development Corp., which was spun off from Santa Fe
Pacific Corp. in the early 1990s, proposed a big box retail development that would
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generate taxes for the city, while luring customers off the freeway and providing retail
services for local residents. Though many locals were less than enthusiastic about the
proposed big box development, the development did include a discount supermarket - the
first of its kind in Emeryville - that was well received by residents. Catallus also
developed an adjacent parcel previously owned by Santa Fe Pacific as residential loft
condominiums, 40% of which are designated affordable housing. Part of the revenues
from the East Baybridge project went into funding the affordable housing.
The project progressed through an environmental review process similar to
NEPA. The process also dove-tailed with the city's effort to obtain funds for the road
and bridge improvement, and the city assisted the developer in raising money for
infrastructure improvements. The negotiations regarding project planning ended in 1994-
1995, and the project itself was completed in 1996.
POLICY CONTEXT
The East Baybridge project is an EPA brownfields pilot project. As a participant
in the pilot program, Emeryville has a mission to "encourage residential and commercial
development by building consensus and developing confidence among all stakeholders in
a 'risk management' based model for brownfields redevelopment, thereby reducing cost
and regulatory uncertainty, while protecting public health and the environment." The city
has used grants from EPA to develop a Groundwater Monitoring Program that includes
many features to address the technical, regulatory, and financial obstacles to brownfields
redevelopment across the city. Among other features, the program established a
community Task Force and a Technical Advisory Team. The Task Force is a 14-member
committee representing residents, businesses, developers, and lenders. The Task Force
sponsored brownfields workshops for local stakeholders and developed a Public
Participation Plan (PPP) for the city's brownfields projects. The Technical Advisory
Team is a group of technical advisors from regulatory agencies and from the fields of
hydrogeology, computer applications, public participation, risk communication, and
finance. The Advisory Team assisted in the development of the PPP and maintains
communications with other agencies doing brownfield work in the San Francisco Bay
area.
In addition to benefiting from the city's Brownfield Pilot initiative, the East
Baybridge project also made use of the California Underground Storage Tank Cleanup
Fund, which was created by California's Legislature in 1991. The UST Fund provides
money to clean up leaking underground petroleum storage tanks through a per-gallon
storage fee assessed to every owner of a petroleum UST subject to regulation under
California's Health and Safety Code.
12 The affordable housing development is not considered a part of the East Baybridge Project for the
purposes of this study, although the housing was built next to the retail center.
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
The East Baybridge retail center is located on the boarder between Emeryville and
Oakland, in the southwest corner of census tract 4251. The tract is middle-income, with
mixed residential and commercial land uses and a population of 5,740. Nearly 15% of
the census tract population is below the poverty line, with 1999 estimated median family
incomes at $58,493, up from $42,305 in 1990. Over half the population is of color:
22.78% of tract residents are African American, and 18.25% are Asian. Just over half
(55.35%) of the housing units are renter occupied, and 11.35% of the housing units are
vacant. The median age of the housing stock is 16 years. The census tract contains 53
hazardous waste generators, 10 point sources of air pollution releases, 2 toxic releases,
and 19 multiple sources of pollution.
The property is located just across the border from Oakland, a few blocks from
interstate 580. Though the interstate is well traveled (it is the eighth busiest juncture in
the country, with 250,000 cars passing the site each day), the property and surrounding
land uses were far from prosperous (Evenson 1991). One of the streets adjacent to the
property, Sao Pablo Avenue, is a major corridor in Emeryville, and has a reputation as
being seedy and unsafe. The street was run down, and littered with card rooms, liquor
stores, and vacant properties.
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVOLVED IN REDEVELOPMENT
At the outset of the East Baybridge project the planning commission hosted a
series of design workshops to envision possible uses for the site. Community members
provided input on project plans through public meetings and at a final public hearing
before the city council. Once the project was approved by JPA, it was subject to a
referendum. The project barely won the vote, but with the city's support the project
passed by a 5% margin.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION AND REMEDIATION
As a former rail yard, the East Baybridge site had a history of industrial use
including foundries and truck maintenance and repair. An asphalt manufacturer caused
the largest contamination on the site. Contamination from this former tenant included
asphalt and diesel fuel. The asphalt manufacturer used to spray the truck bed with diesel
fuel to make asphalt unload easier and used waste oil as weed killer. This type of activity
led to petroleum contamination of the soils. Remediation associated with that single
tenant required $2.5 million in cleanup funds. The tenants were required to conduct the
remediation, but after starting the process and excavating much of the soil, the tenants ran
out of cleanup funds. Catellus was ordered to step in and complete the remediation,
which they did.
Catellus negotiated with local regulators, conducted risk assessments, and
performed an additional characterization of the contaminants on site. After determining
the necessary cleanup procedures, the developer treated and encapsulated the petroleum-
soaked soil on site. Those soils containing lead, zinc, and PCBs were shipped off-site.
Since part of the Catellus property was also used for a residential, soils from that section
of the site were moved to the commercial-industrial portion of the property.
In addition to the soil contamination, three plumes of contaminants in the
groundwater also transected the site. Two of the plumes contained solvents that
originated from beyond the boundaries of the East Baybridge property. Catellus was not
obligated to take any remediation steps for these contaminants. But the third plume
contained solvents emanating from an unidentified on-site source. Catellus installed a
groundwater extraction system and a monitoring system to address this contaminant
plume. The developer also put in place several monitoring wells to confirm that
encapsulated soils were not causing further contamination. Catellus developed an
ongoing monitoring plan, but the developer is now considering whether it would be
feasible to shut of the groundwater extraction system, given an eight-year track record of
good monitoring results. Current concentrations of VOCs in groundwater do exceed state
environmental standards. However, the developer argues that there is "no clean
groundwater in Emeryville," and that it should not be necessary to clean up the
groundwater to the current drinking water standard given that ground water in the area is
not used as a source of drinking water.
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
The East Baybridge redevelopment plan included infrastructure improvements
and construction of several retail chains, including Home Depot, K-Mart, and Pak-n-
Save. The project included improvement of the road infrastructure, and a revenue sharing
agreement between the city of Emeryville and the city of Oakland to share in the
financial benefits of the project.
PROJECT GOALS
Local residents wanted the redevelopment of the site to include retail services,
particularly a grocery store. The project affected both Oakland and Emeryville residents,
although Oakland residents were more affected by the project's traffic. The city of
Emeryville was primarily concerned about increasing tax revenues from the property.
PROJECT BENEFITS/IMPACTS
Economic Benefits
The project has provided significant benefits to the city in terms of tax revenue
generation. The project has been able to use the $225,000 per year in increased tax
revenues from the project to provide for other city services, including an affordable
housing development built on an adjacent property by Catellus development (CUED
2000).
The construction project was estimated to employ 500 workers, many of whom
are local, which Catellus pledged to hire under special city employment programs
(Evenson 1993). The East Baybridge center created approximately 600 new retail jobs
with an average salary of $10 per hour, and local residents received first priority for
employment in these positions (CUED 2000). The project was expected to produce $1.7
million in annual sales tax revenues, $1.1 million of which would finance services in
Emeryville and the remainder in Oakland (Evenson 1993). The project increased local
property values, and has also spurred other investments in the area, including restaurants,
retail businesses serving local residents, and housing development. The project has also
increased demand for housing in the area, and has reduced housing abandonment.
Finally, the project has increased use of existing infrastructure by activating what were
once dead end streets backing up on an old rail spur line.
Social Benefits
The project has increased security in the neighborhood, due in part to a police
substation that was located in the retail complex. The project also provides much needed
retail services to local residents. The project is located in a relatively poor section of the
city, with many elderly residents. Given the need for retail services among the local
population, some neighbors have welcomed the construction of a discount supermarket
(Pak-n-Save). Others have complained that the project does not go far enough to meet
local needs, and that the project should be more oriented towards local restaurants and
shops rather than big box retail chains.
Project proponents argue that the project has generally improved neighborhood
appearances, but there has been controversy over the architectural design of the 450,000
square foot East Baybridge center (DelVecchio 1994). The buildings are boxy and
windowless, with an exposed concrete block and steel exterior, simulating the industrial
buildings of the prior era. Some argue that this design fits in with the industrial history of
the neighborhood, but others feel that the design is unattractive at too large a scale.
When the project began, it was not common for the city to bring in residents into
the design process. But through the course of this project and others like it, the City
Council realized that they needed to go to the residents first when considering a major
development or change in land use. Now citizen involvement is the standard mode of
doing business in Emeryville, and this approach has been institutionalized through the
citizen Task Force and the Public Participation Plan. The city has also seen more and
more citizens' committees form in the wake of this project.
Environmental Benefits
From an environmental perspective, the project did increase public health
protection through the remediation plan, and there has been ongoing groundwater
treatment. In terms of preventing sprawl, this type of shopping center was going to locate
somewhere in the area, given market demand, whether or not it located on this brownfield
site. Because of the limited development opportunities in the area, it was likely that the
site would have located on a brownfield, and not in an outer suburb. Thus, it is not likely
that the decision to locate the retail center on this site directly prevented development of a
greenfield site. Also, big box development tends to be automobile dependent, and so the
project may in fact promote sprawling development, even as it is located in the inner city
(Evenson 1991). However, the East 1aybridge development is accessible by the
Emeryville-Go-Round, a public transit shuttle funded by property owners and the city.
The project did not increase the amount of green space in the city, given that the open
areas are paved as a parking lot.
Negative Project Impacts
Negative impacts on the community have been few. Property taxes have not yet
increased, but real estate prices are on the rise. The city has taken active steps to avoid
gentrification by providing affordable and senior citizen housing in the area, and by
creating a 20% low income set-aside for all residential development.
While the project does not appear to have had substantial negative impacts, some
charge that positive impacts could have been enhanced. The developer acknowledges as
much. The project manager for Catellus points out that at the project's initiation in 1989,
the area was just entering a recession. Since there was "nothing else going on" in terms
of development in the city, the project received a lot of attention from public agencies.
However, the economics of the project would not support the level of density desired by
the city and the developer. The project manager said that, "Today, if same proposal put
forward, it probably would have been rejected, because there was not enough density.
This kind of retail was seen as a way to stimulate area .... When we began our effort in
1989.. .we were planning several million square feet of office, but [when the recession hit
that] just went up in smoke. Mixed-use [development] was not feasible, and then major
retailers began approaching us."
Critics charged that the big box retail format was an under-utilization of the land,
and that the character of the retail would hurt the potential of the area instead of
improving it. Indeed, not all of the retail services targeted have benefited the local
community, and many are designed to attract customers from outside Emeryville.
However, according to the project manger, East Baybridge has not had all of the negative
impacts that critics were predicting. The impact on Sao Pablo Avenue has been much
more beneficial than some predicted, and the upgrading of old infrastructure associated
with the project has "knit this area into the fabric of this city." However, if the land sat
fallow for another seven years, it probably would have been redeveloped into a more
dense, mixed-use development.





State UST Fund 370,000
Total public sources 1,570,000
Publicly Supported Debt
City assessment bond 2,800,000
Private Sources









Infrastructure and Public 4,000,000
Improvements
Total Uses 29,570,000
4 All figures drawn from CUED Performance Evaluation report, with the exception of employment data
which was provided by interviews.
1 Figures for this site could be calculated two different ways, depending on whether publicly supported
debt is considered part of public or private funding sources. Figures in the table include the debt as part of
private costs, however, if the debt were considered as a part of public costs, the following data would
result: public cost/job = $7,283, leverage of private funds per public dollar invested = 5.76
Traditional Metrics"1 4
Permanent Job Creation 600
(30% to local residents)
Public Cost per Job Created $2,616
Tax Base Increase 225,000/yr
Leverage of Private Funds 17.8












East Baybridge Retail Center, San Pablo Avenue and 40th Street, Emeryville CA
Mapping Features
SC Actual BFTI Zone
P EM Potential BFTI Zone
PEM Z/EC

















Source: EPA Enviromapper, U.S. Census Bureau American Fact
Finder
CASE IV: FMC TECHNOLOGY CENTER
SITE HISTORY
The FMC technology center stands on a site just south of the Mississippi River in
Minneapolis. The area around the river played a central role in Minneapolis' history.
The first setters in the early nineteenth century used the river -- and particularly the St.
Anthony Falls, the only waterfall on the length of the Mississippi River -- as a source of
power for milling and sawing operations. Between 1880 and 1930, Minneapolis was the
world's leading flour milling city, but by the 1950s flour milling operations on the
riverfront had largely closed down (Minneapolis Community Development Agency
1999). What was once the city's industial center became an abandoned and neglected
area, and the area's few residential developments were home to some of the city's poorest
citizens. The area directly surrounding the FMC site housed several oil company
facilities and bulk transfer areas, and the Minnesota Gas Company conducted operations
on a site not far away.
In the 1960s, the city identified the Central Riverfront area as a place in need of
redevelopment. The city published its first plan for redevelopment along the river, the
Mississippi Minneapolis plan, in 1972 (Minneapolis Community Development Agency
1999). Several other plans followed, including the Minnesota Technology Corridor Plan,
which the Minneapolis City Council adopted in 1985 (Minneapolis Community
Development Agency 1985).
The vision for the Technology Corridor was to attract high technology firms to
locate in a defined area on the riverfront, in order promote the city's competitive
advantage in a changing national economy and in order to realize physical revitalization
of the Mississippi waterfront. The Technology Corridor was placed just across the river
from the University of Minnesota, and the city envisioned the university as a partner with
the firms that would locate in the Corridor (analogous to the Route 128 region in
Massachusetts near MIT, or the Silicon Valley region in California near Stanford
University). The plan also envisioned an urban mixed-use environment that would offer
housing for employees of the new firms, hotels, restaurants, retail stores, and recreational
opportunities (Minneapolis Community Development Agency 1985).
The FMC technology site was an essential property within the Technology
Corridor that was specifically identified in the Minnesota Technology Corridor Plan.
Before redevelopment, the 3.6-acre site was used as a storage yard for underground gas
tanks. The surface of the property was largely paved, with some areas of scrub trees
growing up wild. There were no buildings on the site.
There had been some interest in redeveloping the site apart from the Technology
Corridor plans in the mid-1980s. For example, a hotel had expressed some interest in
buying the land. But the city's redevelopment agency decided that it would rather
promote high technology development on the site. In order to prepare the way for such
development, the Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA) bought the
site from the previous owner, a gas company, for $900,000. The MCDA was not aware
of contamination on the site at the time of the purchase. This lack of awareness about the
issues of contamination was probably due to the timing of the project; in the mid-1980s
the city administration was far less aware of brownfields issues than it is today.
Once it purchased the land, the MCDA realized the property was contaminated
with petroleum compounds, and the agency remediated the site. FMC Corporation, a
research and development company that specializes in robotics and weapons research for
the U.S. Department of Defense, then approached the MCDA with interest in relocating
some of their office facilities to the site. At the time, FMC's operations were based in
Fridley, Minnesota, a suburb of Minneapolis.
In order to address FMC's concerns about liability on the site, the MCDA retained
title to the property and leased it to FMC at a nominal rate. FMC's lease contained an
option to sell the property. Redevelopment began in 1985, and construction was
completed in 1986. In the early 1990s, FMC experienced a decline in its defense
business, and the firm decided to consolidate its operations at its Fridley location. FMC
exercised its option to sell the property, and the University of Minnesota purchased it for
research facilities.
POLICY CONTEXT
The FMC site was developed before any overarching brownfield policy in
Minnesota. The redevelopment plan did fit within the plan for the Technology Corridor,
as mentioned above, and it fit within a broader program of riverfront revitalization
coordinated by the MCDA. The project benefited from the generous Tax Increment
Financing available in Minneapolis at the time, as well as a state Enterprise Zone grant.
Since the development of the site, the state of Minnesota has passed a
contamination cleanup grant program that provides financing for up to 75% of project
cost for cities undertaking cleanup on sites with redevelopment potential. The State also
passed a Voluntary Investigation and Cleanup Program in 1988, which offers several
types of liability relief. The state also continues to offer various tax incentives for
redevelopment, such as Tax Increment financing and zero property valuations to
maximize the financial incentive for redevelopment
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
The FMC site is located within Census Tract 0047, in Hennepin county,
Minnesota. The tract, which overlaps with the eastern half of the Technology Corridor,
was home to 3,448 residents in 1990, 48.69% of whom were of minority ethnic groups
(American FactFinder 2000). Median household income in 1999 was estimated at
$19,411, up from $13,143 in 1990. In 1990, 50.2% of residents were below the poverty
line, although this number may reflect a large number of students living in the area, given
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the proximity of the site to the University of Minnesota. The area directly around the site
is largely industrial and the census tract includes five point sources of hazardous waste
and one point source of air pollution (EnviroMapper 2000).
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVOLVED IN REDEVELOPMENT
There was no formal stakeholder process for the redevelopment of the FMC site,
except for an Industry Square Committee, made up of business people and industrial
property owners within the area. This site was one of the first where the city became
aware of brownfields issues through the process of redevelopment, and the city invited
very little public involvement. Subsequent redevelopment projects in the area have
included active multi-stakeholder groups with representation of local residents.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION AND TIEMEDIATION
The MCDA undertook remediation on the site by partially cleaning up the soil,
but not the ground water. Soil remediation included excavation and incineration. In
order to address groundwater issues at the site, the city installed a vapor barrier under the
building to prevent the contamination from migrating into the building foundation and
working space. The MCDA also encapsulated part of the site. The MCDA was able to
recoup $1 million of the remediation costs from Pure Oil/UNICAL, which bought out the
original owners of the site.
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
The FMC development involved construction of a 247,000-foot commercial
office building with associated parking facilities.
PROJECT GOALS
The MCDA framed the goals of the project in terms of turning vacant land into
productive properties suitable for high-tech office parks in order to increase the
concentration of high technology firms in the city of Minneapolis. The city also hoped in
enhance the tax base and create jobs through the redevelopment.
PROJECT BENEFITS/ IMPACTS
Economic Benefits
Initial economic benefits of the project included job retention and a tax base
increase. When FMC moved into the Technology Corridor, it relocated 540 research and
development jobs from its Fridley facility to the inner city property. The MCDA believes
that the project served to catalyze business development in the Technology corridor, and
that the project pioneered the concept of reusing old industrial land along Minneapolis'
waterfront and demonstrated that such redevelopment could be a success. Several other
businesses, including a university super computer center, an office and research complex
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for the Red Cross, and a graphic design business have moved into the area. Other
businesses chose to stay within the area rather than relocating. However, after FMC
pulled out to reconsolidate at its Fridley site, the concept of the technology corridor
waned. Job benefits from the redevelopment were disappointing, given that the FMC
redevelopment led to a transfer of jobs, rather than new job creation, and these jobs were
transferred back to the Fridley site after a few years. Tax benefits were also short-lived.
When the project was first developed, the tax base increase to the city reached
$1,300,000 per year. In the late 1990s the property was subsequently sold to the
University of Minnesota, a tax exempt organization.
Redevelopment of the FMC site has also improved utilization of existing
infrastructure in the area. The technology corridor suffered from a jumbled mixture of
utilities and street access. It was very hard to access the river. Through this project an
the others in the technology corridor, the city was able to sort out and reorganize land
ownership patterns and reroute streets and utilities such as sewer lines. The result has
been better connections to the river and better access to the interstate highways. This
process of reorganization and rerouting was more efficient than rebuilding a new
infrastructure system, as would have been necessary in a greenfield site.
Environmental Benefits
The cleanup of the FMC site did reduce contaminants on site, although public
health issues with the site before cleanup were minimal given limited exposure. Soil
remediation prevented further contamination of the ground water, which flows into the
Mississippi River. Fifteen percent of the redeveloped site is not green space, an
improvement from the vacant land and parking lots that preceded redevelopment.
Social Benefits





Tax Increment Financing 1,200,000
















Permanent Job Creation 0
(540 jobs retained)
Public Cost per Job Created N/A
Leverage of Private Funds 15.9
per Public Dollar Invested












15 All figures taken from CUED report.
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The CSX site, as its name suggests, served as a rail yard until the early 1980s.
The former owners of the property used the site for oil changes and maintenance. After
CSX railroad abandoned the site, neighborhood residents used it on occasion for
recreational purposes. However, the land largely remained unproductive.
In the early 1990s, the City of Indianapolis was facing an out-migration of
industrial facilities from the central city to industrial parks on the north and east edges of
the city, and with it a loss of industrial jobs. In an effort to preserve the city's industrial
job base, the city began looking for sites where it could encourage business development
or expansion. The city considered several locations, but settled on the CSX site as a
location where it could minimize the subsidy that would be required by the city (i.e. the
cost of the land over and above what could be recovered on the sale to a new business
locating on the property.) The CSX site totaled twenty-two acres and had been on the
market for seven to nine years. The city was also involved in a nearby renovation for a
public housing project under the Housing and Urban Development Hope 6 program,
which is designed to demolish large-scale public housing projects to accommodate small-
scale, duplex public housing.
The City of Indianapolis acquired the property from CSX, conducted remediation,
and made infrastructure improvements in order to attract development to the site. The
city also actively recruited businesses to the site, including Elevated Head Over Body
(EHOB), a manufacturer of medical equipment. After negotiating on the price of the
property, the city agreed to subsidize the cost of the land and provide a tax abatement in
order to encourage EHOB to locate on the easternmost seven acres of the property. Three
to five months later the western section of the property was purchased by Dickey and
Son, a family run machine and tool company that was planning to relocate to the suburbs.
The city searched for a third tenant to locate on the middle section of the property, but
after a deal with a Styrofoam cuy manufacturer fell through, the city agreed to sell it to
EHOB for its expansion plans.'
POLICY CONTEXT
The city had received some federal brownfields funding through the EPA pilot
program. These funds were used to inventory brownfields in Indianapolis but were not
tapped directly for this project. The project also benefited from several financial
incentives, including a Community Development Block Grant, a general obligation
industrial revenue bond issued by the city, a sliding-scale 10-year property tax abatement,
a 5% personal property tax abatement for capital equipment on the site, and state
employee training funding.
16 The second parcel of EHOB property is not included in the results of this case, due to lack of data
availability.
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
The site is located in an enterprise zone approximately 1.5 miles from the central
business district. The area is primarily residential to the south of the site. A mainline
freight track for the CSX railroad is located to the north of the site.
The census tract where the site is located, tract 3414, is classified as having
moderate income (American FactFinder). Roughly 20% of the population is below the
poverty line. Unemployment within the city as a whole stands at 4%. Estimated median
family income in the census tract for 1999 was $37,756, up from $25,721 in 1990. The
tract contains a population of 2,239 people. Although 1990 census data show that only
4.91% of the population is not white, several people interviewed indicated that the
neighborhood was largely Hispanic. Census data shows roughly equal numbers of Black
and Hispanic residents. The census tract contains 901 housing units, 34.8% of which are
occupied by renters and 10.9% of which are vacant. The median age of the housing stock
is 51 years. The tract also encompasses five point sources of hazardous waste
(EnviroMapper 2000).
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVOLVED IN REDEVELOPMENT
There was no significant stakeholder involvement in redevelopment, other than
the involvement of the city and the potential buyer EHOB.
DESCRIPTION OF CONTAMINATION AND REMEDIATION
The property had been used for rail car maintenance, and waste oil from these
operations was emptied into pits that drained directly into the soil. The site also
contained a number of large objects buried in the ground, including a leaking storage
tank. The tank was pulled and hauled to the landfill. Contaminated soil was removed,
and clean fill was added. There was a plume of groundwater contaminants a little to the
west of the site, but this problem was not addressed in the redevelopment of the
CSX/EHOB property. Once the city completed remediation, it indemnified EHOB
against any future environmental liability. However, this indemnity was simply a
promise from the city to cover future environmental costs. The city did not have any
environmental insurance or escrow funds in place, and so city officials took a risk that no
additional serious contamination would be found on the property. It did turn out that
once EHOB acquired the property, the company found additional objects in the soil,
including stack houses and two underground vaults. EHOB removed these objects before
building on the property.
REDEVELOPMENT PLAN
The project involved demolition of the buildings on the property and construction
of a 60,000 square foot new building on the site for EHOB. The site included room for
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expansion of facilities. EHOB has since acquired a second parcel in the middle of the
CSX property where the company has built a 30,000 square foot building for their
expanding manufacturing facilities. EHOB acquired the second parcel through a no-cost
transfer from the city.
PROJECT GOALS
The city's goals in encouraging development of the CSX property were to retain
and attract investment and jobs to the inner city, maintain the city's tax base, and tap into
existing labor pools within the city. The city hoped that by facilitating development on
the CSX site they could catalyze additional manufacturing development in the area.
PROJECT BENEFITS/IMPACTS
Economic Benefits
When the EHOB facility moved to the CSX site it expanded, creating 30 to 40
jobs in the packaging and manufacturing departments. Local residents have filled
roughly half of these positions. EHOB employs a total of 100 people, and sixty-five of
these positions had existed prior to the company's locating at the CSX site. The company
recruited residents through a temporary agency and then simply by using signs at local
businesses and at the front door of EHO3. Many of the local workers are native Spanish
speakers. The company assigns bilingual employees to work with those who only speak
Spanish so that these positions are accessible for local residents. The pay for these
unskilled positions ranges from $8.25 to $12.00 per hour.
The CSX/EHOB project has encouraged additional manufacturing development in
the area. Several additional properties, including the Westinghouse airbrake facilities, the
Belmont Street warehousing complex, and a Transcom trucking facility have been either
redeveloped or rehabilitated. The city did not directly facilitate these additional projects,
rather, they seem to have emerged out of improved perceptions of business conditions in
the area.
The city agreed to abate taxes on the property for the next several years. Once
taxes are collected on the property the revenues will be available to the city and the
county governments. Revenues collected when the railroad operated the site were
available only to the state, because of the railroad ownership.
The project led to greater use of existing roads, and also prompted the city to
install a storm drainage system that relieves flooding problems on the site and
neighboring properties. In addition, the city re-paved and widened Turner Avenue, and
added new sidewalks.
Social Benefits
A main benefit of the project has been the aesthetic improvement of the
neighborhood. The buildings now on the site are more attractive than the previous rail
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yard and associated buildings, and EHOB has landscaped the property. Approximately
30% of the site is open space which is planted in grass and open to neighborhood
residents for their use. Local children use the site for ballgames and other recreational
activities, and the neighborhood has continued their tradition of setting off fireworks at
the site on the fourth of July.
Environmental Benefits
Environmental benefits resulting from redevelopment have been largely limited to soil
remediation on site. Although the fact that EHOB moved to this site rather than
expanding to a greenfield property is certainly positive, the company had limited funds
for expansion, and probably would have been limited to lower-cost brownfields
properties.
No negative impacts of the project were identified in case study interviews.
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Permanent Job Creation 30-40
Leverage of Private Funds 6.6
per Public Dollar Invested
Tax Base Increase N/A (Tax abatement)
7 All figures are taken from CUED report, except for job data which was taken from interviews.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS
The case studies described in the previous chapter vary widely in their project goals and
benefits. A review of primary project goals (Table 1) reveals that economic
development, narrowly defined in terms of job creation and increased tax revenues, do
not dominate project objectives across all reuse types. Three additional project goals
that emerge out of these case studies are provision of local services and amenities (e.g.
retail and housing), fulfillment of planning objectives, and improved public perception of
the project area.
Table 1. Summary of Project Goals for Case Studies
Reuse Type Case Study Primary Project Goals
Industrial CSX/EHOB Job creation, tax revenues
Office FMC Technology Center Fulfillment of plan for technology corridor
Retail East Baybridge Provision of retail services, tax revenues
Recreational - Blockbuster Sony Center Fulfillment of waterfront revitalization
Cultural plan, improved city image, jobs
Housing Westheimer Rigging Affordable elder housing
The case studies show that project benefits are equally diverse (Table 2). Common
economic benefits include not only job creation and increases to the tax base, but also
reduced business and residential abandonment, increased business investment, increased
local property values, and greater utilization of existing infrastructure. Environmental
benefits tend to be either less extensive than social and economic benefits, or less
observable to those people interviewed. However, environmental benefits do include
open space enhancement and groundwater protection. Common social benefits range
from reduced local housing and business abandonment, to increased citizen involvement
and increased political or media attention to the area.
The evidence from a sample of typical brownfields cases for each of five
redevelopment classes suggest that the benefits of brownfields redevelopment are diverse
and site specific. Even for projects whose goals were primarily defined in terms of
economic development benefits (job creation and increased tax revenues), public benefits
included a diversity of broader social and environmental benefits. Some of these non-
economic benefits turned out to be quite important in the overall results of the project,
even if they were not identified as goals for the project. In addition, most of the projects
examined had multiple goals, spanning both economic and non-economic dimensions of
public benefit from the redevelopment.
Table 2. Summary of Project Benefits for Case Studies
CASE Economic Benefits Environmental Social Benefits
STUDY Benefits
CSX/EHOB - Between 15 and 20 jobs for local * Soil remediation e Aesthetic benefits
residents, 30 to 40 jobs created - Avoided company - Open space for
overall - salaries for local residents relocation to a recreation
between $8.50 and $12 per hour greenfield area
" Business development in the area
- Future tax benefits
M Utilization of existing infrastructure
* Increased municipal investment in
local infrastructure
Westheimer m 11 permanent jobs M Enhanced open 0 Provision of services
Rigging - 150 Construction Jobs space (rails-to- (affordable housing) to
- Improved business conditions trails conversion) local residents
N Increased local investment and M Groundwater * Reduced housing
property improvement protection and abandonment
- Increased municipal investment in reduced public * Increased community
local infrastructure health risk organization,
M Reduced pressure collaboration with
for urban sprawl other community
(perceived, not groups
pdocumented)
Blockbuster a 500 part-time, seasonal jobs * Enhanced * Improved public
Sony Center m 15 permanent jobs accessibility and image of Camden
0 PILOT payment: $770,000 per year desirability of open * Improved appearance
for 30 yrs. space near the site of site area
through aesthetic 0 Prevention of further
improvements abandonment of
(note that access to housing and
some of this open businesses
space is limited to
ticket holders)
East H Tax base increase: 225,000/yr a Increased public M Provision of retail
Baybridge (helps to finance affordable housing health protection services, particularly a
development) * Groundwater discount grocery store
* $1.7 million in annual sales tax remediation for local residents
revenues n Increased security
a 500 construction jobs employing 0 Improved citizen
local workers involvement
B 600 retail jobs, average salary N Improve political
$ 10/hour awareness of area
- Increased local property values Increased housing
E Increased investment and business demand, reduced
development abandonment
d Activation of dead-end streets
FMC 540 jobs retained (temporarily) Prevented further n Improved local
Technology m Catalyzed business development in contamination of infrastructure
Center technology corridor ground water 0 Increased access to the
0 Tax base increase: $1,300,000 per Limited green river
ye r (until transfer to Univ. of MN) spac creationsi
It seems that both project goals and benefits across the types of projects studied
can be broader than the public benefits measured by the traditional benchmarks of jobs,
taxes, and leverage of private funds. The fact that project goals are broader than
traditional measures of project benefits suggests that the traditional benchmarks need to
be reassessed and enhanced. As CUED (1999) states, "Meaningful benchmarks must
align with the primary goals of the program... .Projects whose primary goals are not
economic may not score highly in economic benchmarks... .While these sites may not
produce 'good numbers,' there will be large human and environmental health gains." If
we accept that benchmarks should reflect project goals, then the benchmarks for
brownfields redevelopment should be expanded beyond the traditional metrics.
However, this supposition is correct only if two additional conditions hold true:
first, if there are additional dimensions of public benefit that are sufficiently common to a
diversity of projects so that they could be usefully measured as benchmarks of success,
and second, if adding additional benchmarks would enable a better overall evaluation of
the success of brownfields policies or a better way to evaluate competing projects
applying for public funding.
Regarding the first condition, although the projects provided a diversity of public
benefits, the most common benefits other than job provision and tax revenues include:
1) reduced abandonment of housing and businesses,
2) increased investment in local businesses,
3) provision of amenities and services to local residents (housing and retail), and
4) increased utilization of existing infrastructure or resources (e.g. streets, utilities,
and natural resources such as rivers and shoreline).
Of these benefits, the former benefits are not conducive to benchmarks for the
purposes of prioritizing projects, since they are not easily predicted. However, residential
and business trends in the neighborhood could be tracked after a brownfields project in
order to assess the degree to which revitalization actually occurred. New business
statistics - such as percent increase in businesses within the census tract or neighborhood
- could be acquired through local Chambers of Commerce or city departments.
Demographic changes such as increase or decrease in population, changes in ethnic or
racial composition, and housing vacancies are easily tracked via census data (although
these data are limited to ten year intervals). Tracking changes in property values could
also be helpful to assess the impacts of the brownfields redevelopment on surrounding
areas, and in combination with demographic statistics, these data could be used to
monitor trends towards gentrification.
The latter common benefits of provision of amenities and services to local
residents and increased utilization of existing infrastructure and resources could be
predicted before project initiation, and therefore could be, used as a standard tool to
evaluate and prioritize potential projects. These benefits may not lend themselves to
quantitative statistics, but rather qualitative descriptions of the types of benefits provided
and the populations that will be served. Qualitative benchmarks of amenity provision
should document the extent to which there is local demand for services provided.
This research did not reveal an obvious case where traditional benchmarks and
qualitative analysis told dramatically different stories about the result of each project.
However, there are different conclusions that could be drawn from a qualitative analysis
in comparison to evaluation of traditional benchmarks. Table 2 shows how each case
study project would be evaluated according to traditional benchmarks.
Table 2. Traditional Benchmark Analysis
Jobs Tax Base Increase Leverage
a) Total a) gross tax base a) Private Funds per
permanent jobs increase per year Public Dollar
created b) tax revenue per acre Invested
b) public $/job per year b) public $ as a % of
total
East Baybridge 9  a) 600 a) $225,000 a) 17.8
b) $2,126 b) $9,000 b) 5 %
Blockbuster-Sony a) 515 (part a) $770,000 a) 1.2
Entertainment time/seasonal) (PILOT for 30 years) b) 45%
Center b) $49,300 b) $5,133
CSX/EHOB a) 30-40 N/A (10 year sliding a) 6.6
b) $6,044-$8,058 tax abatement) b) 13%
Westheimer a) 11 None a) 309.1
Rigging20  b) $1,255 b) 0.3%
FMC a) 0 a) $1,300,000 a) 15.9
Technology2' b) N/A b) $361,111 b) 6%
18 Includes seasonal jobs, excludes temporary construction jobs and retained jobs because such positions
may have been created through other development initiatives even if this project had not gone forward.
19 Figures for this site could be calculated two different ways, depending on whether publicly supported
debt is considered part of public or private funding sources. Figures in the table include the debt as part of
private costs, however if the debt were considered as a part of public costs, the following data would result:
public $/job = $7,283, leverage public: private funds =5.76, public $ as a % of total funds: 14.78%
20 Figures for this site could be calculated two different ways, depending on whether publicly supported
debt is considered part of public or private funding sources. Figures in the table include the debt as part of
private costs, however if the debt were considered as a part of public costs, the following data would result:
public $/job = $346,709, leverage public: private funds = 0.1219, public $ as a % of total funds: 89.13%
2 Figures are calculated based on use of the site by FMC Technology. The property has since been sold
the University of Minnesota, and some statistics, e.g. tax base increase, no longer apply.
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If viewed purely from the perspective of job creation, the East Baybridge project
would clearly be a top performer, with creation of 600 jobs at a relatively low cost to the
public. The E-Center, while ostensibly a cultural/recreational project, created the second
largest number of jobs, but at a much higher public cost per job created. From a tax
revenue perspective, the FMC Technology site seepis to deliver the greatest public
benefit, followed by East Baybridge as a distant second. If success is measured in terms
of public leverage of private funds, the results are less clear. Depending on how publicly
supported debt is counted, Westheimer Rigging may have the greatest or the least
leverage of private funds. Aside from that project, East Baybridge and FMC have the
greatest public leverage figures. Thus, across all three areas measured by the traditional
benchmarks, East Baybridge and FMC Technology projects seem to lead the provision of
public benefits.
How do these results compare to the qualitative sense of community benefits
developed in the case studies? There is no clear winner in from the qualitative data, and
yet it could be argued that a top performer from the quantitative sense -- East Baybridge -
- was a site where further public benefits were initially envisioned were not provided due
to slack market demand. In this case, the question became not whether the project was
beneficial (it was), but whether it was good enough to meet local expectations. Had the
project waited for an upswing in the real estate market, it would have been able to be
built out to a greater density, with greater provision of services to local residents and
perhaps less focus on customers passing by on the nearby interstate. Ultimately, the
cities of Emeryville and Oakland decided that East Baybridge was good enough given
current market conditions, but that conclusion was by no means unanimous, and the
project only narrowly passed the local referendum. In this example, the city and the local
residents clearly understood these trade-offs, and debated them actively.
However, in other projects, the trade-offs may not be as apparent. For example,
the E-Center in Camden has been widely hailed as a successful redevelopment on the
Delaware River. The project is explicitly oriented towards suburban, affluent customers
on the outskirts of Philadelphia, and yet because of this orientation it has had few direct
benefits for local residents, other than reduced housing abandonment. If the benchmarks
of providing services to the local community and utilizing existing infrastructure and
resources had been carefully considered both by project proponents and the community,
perhaps the project could have been equally successful with out-of-town customers while
still providing tangible benefits to the local residents. For example, revitalization beyond
the confines of the waterfront district may have been more likely if local businesses were
tapped to offer services and food within the E-Center, and if the street infrastructure
leading to downtown Camden had been enhanced with lighting and streetscape
improvements in order to draw customers to local businesses.
If these five cases studies were compared qualitatively across social, economic,
and environmental dimensions, the results would likely differ than the traditional
economically focused analysis. Although there are many potential benefits that could be
assessed, I have selected two facets of each dimension of public benefits that I believe are
most important to add to the traditional benchmarks. My qualitative assessment of these
factors is summarized below in Table 3.
Table 3. Alternative Benchmark Analysis
Social Economic Environmental
a) Increased a) Increased a) Reduced human
community investment in exposure to
organizing local businesses environmental
capacity b) Increased contaminants
b) Improved prosperity of b) Reduced potential
neighborhood residents for off-site
stability environmental
contamination
East Baybridge a) Yes a) Yes a) Yes





Westheimer a) Yes, a a) Yes a) Yes, although
Rigging significant b) Not yet apparent contamination was
benefit as a not initially severe
result of LLC's b) Groundwater
outreach monitoring only




CSX/EHOB a) No a) Yes a) Yes
b) Not clear from b) Probably b) No
interviews
FMC Technology a) No a) Yes a) Yes, although
b) No b) No extent of exposure
initially was small
b) No
Blockbuster Sony a) No a) No a) Yes, although
Entertainment b) Not yet, b) No extent of exposure
Center although may have been
perhaps in the small initially
future b) No
The results shown here are preliminary and subjective, based on my interpretation of the
case study interviews and research. Further work would clearly need to be done in order
to develop standardized methods to evaluate these factors. However, it is my sense that
by using these alternative measures of project success in addition to the traditional
economic development benchmarks, it would be possible to create more complete picture
of project success. East Baybridge still stands out as a top performing project (given
market constraints), as it did with the traditional benchmark analysis. However, the FMC
project performs less well, as does the Blockbuster Sony Entertainment Center.
Westheimer Rigging also performs very well in this analysis. It is worth noting that
although East Baybridge and Westheimer Rigging were very different projects at
different scales and with different goals, both included significant community
involvement in the project planning and review processes -- more than any of the other
projects reviewed. Though I do not have the data to prove a causal relationship between
community involvement in project review and planning and community benefits resulting
from redevelopment, it does seem reasonable to expect that community involvement
would lead to improved community benefits.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. While much of the discussion of policy goals for brownfields redevelopment
speaks in terms of community revitalization, traditional evaluation techniques
tend to focus on benefits for the broader (non-local) public.
Traditional evaluative benchmarks for brownfields redevelopment, such as an increased
tax base, leverage of private funds, and total job creation, are important and helpful to
understanding the public benefits of brownfields projects and policies. However, these
traditional benchmarks are more relevant to city officials and the public as a whole than
to local residents who have most directly borne the impacts of brownfields. If the adage
that what is measured is managed is true, then it is important to be thoughtful which
evaluative measures are used so that the lessons learned can provide appropriate feedback
for policy improvement. If part of the objectives of brownfields policies are to revitalize
disadvantaged communities, it will be important to measure the progress in terms of
benefits to the local community as well as the general public. Future evaluative
techniques should include benchmarks of local community benefits, such as jobs for local
residents, increased provision of community services, and enhanced access to local
resources and infrastructure.
2. Traditional evaluative techniques for brownfields tend to focus on economic
benefits, but the actual benefits demonstrated in typical projects are much
broader, and many important (if unforeseen) results of such projects are social
and environmental.
Given the broad array of actual project benefits, evaluative techniques should be
expanded to measure not only economic benefits, but also environmental and social
benefits. As noted in the previous section, the most common benefits not included in the
traditional benchmarks but found in this study include:
1) reduced abandonment of housing and businesses,
2) increased investment in local businesses,
3) provision of amenities and services to local residents (housing and retail), and
4) increased utilization of existing infrastructure or resources (e.g. streets, utilities, and
natural resources such as rivers and shoreline).
Although the first two benefits are primarily economic factors, they closely relate to
social benefits. The latter two benefits are primarily social, but may also include
environmental aspects (e.g. access to natural resources such as water bodies). If these
social and environmental dimensions of redevelopment are ignored, brownfields
redevelopment may result in unnecessary tradeoffs between increased employment or
tax revenues and improved social fabric and health of a neighborhood. Careful
monitoring of all dimensions of redevelopment benefits should help avoid a lopsided
implementation of brownfields policies that could encourage economic development at
the expense of opportunities for enhancing quality of life and a healthy environment.
3. Environmental benefits are less evident in project results than economic and
social benefits. Greater emphasis on evaluating the environmental benefits of
redevelopment and coordination spiong various regulatory agencies could help
avoid negative environmental Impacts of reuse.
Brownfields are defined by their history of environmental contamination, yet in the
redevelopment of these sites, it seems that the environmental benefits of remediation are
less obvious or impressive to stakeholders than social and economic benefits. The most
common environmental benefits include protection of groundwater and creation of open
space. These benefits are important, and should be incorporated into project evaluations.
Other potential benefits could be examined as well. For those sites with an industrial
reuses, evaluators might consider the extent to which the new operations on the property
employ pollution prevention strategies in order to prevent re-pollution of remediated
sites. Although industrial practices have become cleaner in the last several decades,
industrial facilities are often still responsible for air, water, and soil pollution, either on-
or off-site. Employing pollution prevention techniques in order to avoid further
contamination on sites and in neighborhoods that have a history of environmental distress
would clearly be a benefit to the public and the community. This benefit should be
included in an overall assessment of project outcomes. Likewise, any property reuse
(particularly retail and office properties with significant acreage devoted to parking)
could provide public benefits in terms of site design that minimizes the effect of urban
runoff on nearby surface water. In order to realize these benefits, they will need to be
incorporated into project evaluation.
In addition, brownfields regulators should coordinate with representatives of pollution
prevention and environmental planning departments in order to identify opportunities for
improving the environmental profile of redevelopment plans. Current regulatory
approaches towards brownfields redevelopment often place responsibility for
redevelopment oversight into the hands of hazardous waste cleanup and economic
development departments. While these perspectives are clearly central to achieving
appropriate remediation and redevelopment outcomes, additional expertise - particularly
with regard to pollution prevention and site design - could help ensure that
environmental benefits from redevelopment projects are optimized.
4. Since project goals tend to predict project benefits, it is important to consider
the extent to which project goals and planning processes incorporate community
perspectives.
Most of the projects reviewed in this research at least partially fulfilled their project
objectives, however, not all projects incorporated community benefits as part of the
project goals. For example, the Blockbuster Sony Center was largely oriented towards a
non-local audience, and benefits were envisioned on the scale of an entire city (e.g.
improved perceptions of and investment in Camden), rather than any specific
neighborhood or community. The resulting benefits from this project have not tended to
accrue to the local community or even to other neighborhoods in Camden. Rather, the
public benefits have tended to accrue to the city government and have benefited the
residents of Camden only indirectly. More locally oriented projects, such as the
Westheimer Rigging redevelopment, produced greater community based benefits.
Not only do project goals vary in the degree to which they incorporate community
concerns, but so to do project planning processes. Of the projects examined here, only
two - Westheimer Rigging and East Baybridge - involved local communities in any
significant way. Community input was incorporated either through a community-based
project proponent or by way of public planning processes such as workshops, hearings,
and a referendum. Although the ultimate public benefits any project can provide are
limited by market demand for redevelopment, public involvement in the planning stages
of the project can enhance the scope of benefits envisioned for the project.
Fortunately, there are models for increasing community involvement in project planning.
For example, the EPA's brownfields pilot program includes a significant public
participation component for project planning. The American Society For Testing And
Materials Standard Guide for Process of Sustainable Brownfields Redevelopment
(ASTM 2000) provides another model of community involvement. However, few state
policies seem to encourage or require community involvement in planning for
brownfields redevelopment. The proposed legislation in New York is one example
where the state is providing grants to encourage community-based plans for
redevelopment. If brownfields projects are to meet widely held execrations of
revitalization of disadvantaged communities, then this approach should be more widely
adopted.
5. Opportunistic, rather than site-specific, planning may lead to greater public
benefits from brownfields redevelopment, especially when driven by public or non-
profit agencies.
Two of the cases described in this research, namely Westheimer Rigging and
CSX/EHOB, resulted from an opportunistic mode of development. Project proponents or
city officials identified a certain type of development they wanted to promote - housing
in one instance and manufacturing in the other - and then worked to find a suitable sites
for redevelopment. The Westheimer Rigging project fulfilled the objectives of the Latino
Learning Center - namely to provide affordable housing for elders and improve
conditions in the East End neighborhood. These objectives were not initially tied to the
Westheimer Rigging site, but rather the site was used opportunistically in order to meet
those community objectives. The CSX/EHOB project emerged out of a city initiative to
keep jobs in central Indianapolis and promote urban business development. The city
went in search of a suitable redevelopment site and a manufacturing company to occupyit, and the results were substantial improvements to the neighborhood and provision ofjobs for local residents. Both projects resulted in locally oriented redevelopment that
provided tangible and substantial benefits to the local communities in which they were
placed.
Although it is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions from such a small sample
size, it is worth considering whether such an opportunistic approach to brownfields
redevelopment could generally provide greater benefits for communities and the public
compared to site-specific redevelopment plans. In this case, project initiators were either
public (the city in the case of CSX/EHOB) or private non-profit (in the case of
Westheimer Rigging). But private developers tend to operate in a similar manner: their
objectives are to maximize profit given a certain level of risk through project
development, and they work opportunistically find sites and locations that meet this
overall goal. If publicly-oriented planners were to start by identifying project objectives
and public benefits they wanted to provide, and then finding a brownfields site that could
meet that objective, they might be more likely to produce the ultimate benefits sought.
Of course, this approach might result in "cherry picking" of the worst sort - i.e. public
planners choosing first tier sites for redevelopment and ignoring the rest. But the results
of this study suggest that the reality may not be so simple. Both the Westheimer Rigging
and CSX/EHOB sites - those developed around a project specific plan - would probably
be classified as Tier 2 sites, compared to the others in this research. Both are located in
census tracts with moderate household incomes and moderate residential vacancy rates,
compared to the others in this study,
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Although both sites were ultimately marketable for their respective goals, they required
either substantial up-front public investment or involvement of a community-based non-
profit agency. Therefore, based on this research, we might expect a project-based rather
than site specific redevelopment strategy to address Tier 2 sites (and perhaps Tier 1 as
well), but such a strategy might leave behind Tier 3 sites. This brings us to the next
point.
6. Planning alone cannot provide public benefits beyond what the market will bear.
Public investment is critical for less marketable sites.
This research confirms what is generally recognized in the literature, namely that no
amount of planning, whatever its form, can push the envelope of public and community
benefits beyond what the market will bear. Only public (or private non-profit)
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investment in non-marketable sites can result in successful redevelopment with benefits
for local communities. The East Baybridge example is instructive on this point.
Although project proponents and community members all desired a higher density
development, market demand at the time of the project did not support such density.
7. Building capacity and resources for community-based redevelopment could lead
to significant public benefits, especially for second- and third-tier sites.
The Westheimer Rigging project is an excellent example of the potential for community-
based redevelopment. Although in that case redevelopment funding came largely from
private sources and publicly supported debt, in some cases it may be necessary to transfer
funds to community based groups in order to undertake redevelopment. In other cases,
community-based redevelopment could be promoted through training for community
representatives and collaboration with developers.
8. Under certain circumstances, prioritizing projects for the purposes of public
funding is essential. Impacts of the brownfield on the surrounding area and
potential benefits of redevelopment should be carefully considered as factors for
prioritization.
If public funds or resources are limited, as they usually are, and such resources are
necessary to convert second- and third-tier sites into financially viable projects, then
public agencies should give careful consideration to how to prioritize projects for public
funding. Current negative impacts of the project on surrounding neighborhoods and
potential benefits are particularly important factors that should be considered when
allocating scare funding. If the brownfield is currently a significant liability for the
neighborhood or the city, and if the brownfield is actively contributing to local
disinvestment, the project should take priority for public funding. Public officials
administering funding should consider not only the condition of the neighborhood, but
the relationship of the brownfield with the cycle of disinvestment. Since many factors in
addition to environmental contamination can conspire to depress conditions in a
neighborhood, officials should consider the extent to which the brownfield is a causal
factor in the disinvestment. Other factors at work may include poor infrastructure,
location, or security. To the extent that these factors can be changed, they should be
integrated into a cohesive plan that addresses not only the brownfield but the general
context of disinvestment and poor quality of life in the neighborhood.
If the brownfield is not having a substantial degree of impact on surrounding
neighborhoods, or if disinvestment is less severe than in other areas, public officials may
have the opportunity to push for greater public benefits to result from the project, perhaps
by altering the project structure or delaying the project until market conditions improve.
9. Local and state governments should adopt a dual track approach for brownfields
redevelopment.
Experts have suggested that strategies for brownfields redevelopment distinguish
between the different tiers of brownfields sites (rtsch personal communication, Smart
Growth Network 1996). Those sites that are highly marketable should be allowed to
proceed with minimal government involvement or investment, other than lifting the
weight of environmental liability for innocent parties and easing regulatory burdens.
Such programs can be largely privatized, although it is still advisable to require or
suggest some level of community involvement in the planning process to ensure that
opportunities for community benefits are not overlooked. Public officials should expect
that these highly marketable sites be able to pay back any public investment that a city or
state undertakes, either directly (e.g. through loan payments or tax revenues), or
indirectly (through spill-over development and private investment in the area). Further
research would be helpful in documenting the financial benefits of spill-over
development resulting from brownfields.
For less-marketable sites, public attention needs to shift to revitalization of sites imposing
the greatest burdens on their neighborhoods and those offering the greatest potential
public benefits. Public investment can help make sites more marketable to the private
sector (e.g. through infrastructure improvement), or may be purely public in nature (e.g.
developing parks and recreation areas). In either case, public and community benefits
should be sufficient to justify public investment. The notion that brownfields present
win-win opportunities for the public and private sectors should not be overstated.
Revitalization and redevelopment can go hand-in-hand, but only if attention is paid and
resources are devoted to the opportunities for public benefits as well as the private sector
requirements.
10. Although the problems that brownfields create give a sense of urgency to the
call for redevelopment, brownfields redevelopment projects should be carefully
planned with the long-term impacts of the project in mind.
Short-term thinking and inadequate information about the impacts of industrial
development and operations first gave rise to brownfields contamination, but there is now
a possibility that these same factors will lead to less than optimal redevelopment patterns.
Since brownfields sites can lead to a host of environmental, economic, and social
problems, there is a sense of urgency about providing incentives for redevelopment. This
urgency is well placed, particularly for those fraction of sites that are truly having an
impact on surrounding properties and natural resources, as well as the health and well-
being of neighboring communities. However, if redevelopment is poorly planned, and
any redevelopment is accepted as equally good simply by the fact of building on a
brownfield, there may be huge opportunity costs. Different redevelopment options may
have widely different impacts and benefits on the neighborhood and the region in which
they are located. Some proponents of redevelopment may use the fact that the new
facility covers up contaminated soil as an excuse for poorly planned development. In
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order to realize the potential inherent in the redevelopment of brownfields, those who
make and implement brownfields policies should encourage a careful weighing of the
costs and benefits of the redevelopment options across economic, environmental, and
social dimensions.
APPENDIX A: POTENTIAL IMPACTS Of BROWNFTELDS REDEVELOPMENT
Type of Benefit/Cost Discussion
Environmental
Benefits
Reduced health risks Evaluation of existing risks, based on contamination and exposures, and
reductions in those risks resulting from remediation and redevelopment.
Environmental justice Socio-demographic evaluation of the beneficiaries of redevelopment.
Prevention/Reduction of air Due to curbing urban sprawl; most significant as commercial and industrial
pollution (mobile source redevelopment occurs, providing jobs for city residents.
emissions)
Due to reduction in urban sprawl; greenfield development replaces absorptive
Ground water protection and land with impervious surfaces and treated lawns which can prevent clean
flood risk reduction rainwater from flowing into aquifers and streams.
cosystemand wetland Redevelopment plans may also include wetland restoration and protection within
cysteatond wurban areas; also due to curbing urban sprawl.
restoration
This applies to parks, open spaces, and community gardens redevelopment.
reation of green spaces
Economic Benefits
Jobs created by the redevelopment may not benefit the local community if
residents do not have the necessary education or training to fill these jobs. The
ob creation and potential for redevelopment project may need to be coupled with education and/or job
higher incomes training.
Increasing urban infill may provide more job opportunities to city residents,
thereby reducing job search costs, labor market search costs, and relocation
mprove labor market efficiency costs.
y i While increased property values will increase owners assets and the city's taxIncreased property values in revenues, increases in property values are not always desirable because higher
urrounding area and redeveloped taxes and rents may lead to gentrification.
brownfield site
[ncreased tax revenues Due to returning property to productive use and increasing property values.
Redevelopment has the potential to improve neighborhood quality and overall
Spill-over economic effects business conditions in the area.
Avoided congestion, accidents, Due to reduction in urban sprawl and commuting.
and highway costs
Increasing the desirability to live in the city may result from urban infill.
Commensurate benefits include avoiding expenses of new construction,
Prevent housing abandonment preventing crime that often occurs in and around abandoned buildings, and
improving the aesthetics in the area.
Increased utilization of existing Reduced pressure to provide infrastructure to outlying areas as urban sprawl is
infrastructure
reduced; higher utilization of public utilities and transportation in the city.
Social Benefits
Increase in easily accessible
services
Affordable Housing
Restored sense of control and
neighborhood empowerment;
renewed sense of hope and pride
Improved city services
Aesthetics
This applies to commercial development; many inner city neighborhoods do not
have easy access to grocery stores or other important amenities.
For residential development only.
These types of benefits are most likely to result when there is a high degree of
community involvement in brownfield site cleanup and redevelopment planning.
Increases in tax revenues generated by redevelopment may enable the city to
provide better public services (e.g., schools, transportation, recreation).
Improved appearance and overall neighborhood quality may result from all types
of redevelopment projects, although these are especially likely for parks, open
spaces and community gardens.
Social and
Environmental Costs
Industrial redevelopment of sites may have a negative impact on the community,
e-pollution or creation of if redevelopment occurs carelessly without pollution prevention and aesthetic
eyesores considerations.
otential future human health and Non-permanent, low-cost remedies (e.g., institutional controls) may harbor
environmental risks future risks, particularly if land uses change.
Cleanup and development may cause temporary disruption, risk and annoyance
Disruption to nearby residents.
Economic Costs
Cleanup costs Estimate cleanup costs and consider associated uncertainty.
Subsidies to business, building expenses associated with public projects, such as
Public development costs community centers, parks and open areas.
Road access, utilities, and other conditions may need to be improved before
Infrastructure improvements development can occur.
Environmental site assessments required, which involve engineering consulting
nvironmental characterization fees and legal fees.
Liability uncertainties create difficulties in obtaining loans and may also increase
High financing charges the collateral required or the interest rates.
Source: Smart Growth Network 1996.
APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
INTRODUCTION:
Hello, my name is Tracy Dyke. I'm a graduate student in the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning at MIT. I'm currently writing a thesis on the subject of how to
measure the public benefits of brownfields redevelopment. I was referred to you by
. I am hoping to use the project as a case study in my thesis. I was
wondering if you would be able to spend a little time talking with me about this project.
I believe it would take about 1 hour in order to go through the questions I have about the
project. If you're willing to help, we could schedule a time for the interview that is
convenient for you.
Interview:
Thanks for agreeing to spend some time talking with me about the - project. As I
mentioned before, my goal in doing this research is to better understand how to measure
the public benefits of brownfields redevelopment by considering a few projects of
different types. In order to understand the project better, I am going to ask you some
questions about the area where the project took place, your involvement in the projects,
and your understanding of the goals and results of the project. Do you have any
questions before we begin?
BACKGROUND
Please tell me whether the project is complete? If not, what stage of completion is the
project currently in?
NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
First I'd like to ask you a few questions about the neighborhood in which the project is
located and the brownfields property before the redevelopment project occurred.
1. In which neighborhood did this project take place?
2. Are there other neighborhoods or areas that have been directly affected by the
project? O yes O no
If yes, what are they?
3. I'd like you to think about the five years or so prior to the redevelopment project. In
that time period would you say that there was in increase in economic activity (e.g.





4. Are you aware of any plans other than the brownfields project that were directed
toward improving the neighborhood? O yes C no
If yes, what were they?
GOALS
Now I want to ask you a few questions about the goals
project.
1. At the outset of this project or your involvement in
would accomplish?
of the brownfields redevelopment
it, what did you hope or expect
2. Were you aware of expectations or hopes that others had for the project?
C no
O7 yes
If yes, what were they?
3. Are you aware of any goals that were jointly established or agreed upon by
individuals or groups involved in the project? 0 yes C3 no
If yes, what were they?
BENEFITS
Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about what the project has actually
accomplished. My emphasis on public benefits provided by the project, rather than
benefits provided to an individual property owner or the redeveloper of the property.
I'm going to read you a list of possible public benefits that could result from a
brownfields redevelopment project. For each possible public benefit, I'd like you to tell
me whether you believe that the project has produced this result. If you think the project
has produced this benefit, please tell me how you have observed this change, or what
evidence you have seen that leads you to believe that this benefit has been realized.
I have divided up the possible benefits into three categories: social benefits,
environmental benefits, and economic benefits. The first category is social...
Has this project resulted in...
1. Improved neighborhood appearances
2. Greater local control over the future of the neighborhood
3. Improved sense of community empowerment and pride
4. Increased political attention towards the neighborhood
5. Increased neighborhood organization or organizing capacity
The next category is environmental benefits. Has this project resulted in...
6. reduced human health risks as a result of environmental cleanup
7. reduced environmental injustice, i.e. reducing environmental health risks to poor or
minority communities
8. protecting ground water from contamination
9. preventing urban sprawl in your region
10. ecosystem protection or restoration
11. creation of green space for recreation or wildlife habitat
The next category is economic benefits. Has this project resulted in...
12. Job creation and/or higher incomes for residents in the project neighborhood
13. Job creation and/or higher incomes for residents outside of the project neighborhood
14. Increased property values in the nearby properties
15. Increased tax revenues
16. Improved business conditions in the neighborhood
17. Reduced commuting time and costs
18. Reduced abandonment of housing or businesses
19. More efficient use of existing infrastructure (e.g. public utilities and roads)
Are there other benefits that have resulted from the project? C yes C no
If yes, what are they?
What would you say is the most important public benefit that this project produced?
Are there public benefits that you expect this project to produce over the long term, but
which have not yet been realized? C yes 0 no
If yes, what are they, and how long do you think it will take for them to be realized?
Are there any downsides or negative impacts that you believe are a result of this project?




3) increased pollution due to new industry
4) general disruption
BUT FOR THIS PROJECT
Now I want to ask you about what would have happened in this neighborhood if the
project hadn't gone forward. First, lets consider the redevelopment use.
Were the redevelopers considering alternate places where could have built a (type
of project)?
Could you briefly describe the alternate sites?
Now I'd like you to think about what would have happened at this site if the property had
not been redeveloped with this project. If this redevelopment project had not occurred,
would the site still be vacant, or do you think there were other possible developments that
might have occurred on the property?
Are there any changes or improvements in the neighborhood that may have occurred for
reasons other than this specific brownfields project (e.g. general improvement of the
economy, or investments in the neighborhood not related to the brownfields site)?
CONTACTS
Can you tell me who were the other key parties involved in the project? What is their
contact information?
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